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With the appointment to the Supreme Court by President
Truman in the late summer and early fall of 1949 of Tom
Clark and Sherman Minton, as successors to the deceased
Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Rutledge, a judicial era
was waning and a new one beginning.' When these two latest
appointees to the Court took their places on the bench at the
outset of the 1949-50 Term, President Truman had appointed
four of the nine justices who presently comprise the Supreme
Court.2 His predecessor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
had appointed a total of eight justices during his long tenure
as Chief Executive.' One of these resigned,4 and the deaths
of Justice Murphy and Rutledge left five Roosevelt appoin-
tees on the Court at the outset of the 1949-50 Term. The
unprecedented opportunities that had been presented to the
late President Roosevelt for appointing members of the Su-
preme Court who were favorably disposed to the political,
economic, and social philosophy of his Democratic adminis-
tration were not wasted. The story of how the "Nine Old
I Mr. Justice Clark, Attorney General under President Truman, was appointed
to succeed Mr. Justice Murphy who died on July 19, 1949. Mr. Justice Minton,
former United States Senator from Indiana and judge on the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, succeeded Mr. justice Rutledge, who
had followed his colleague, Justice Murphy, in death on September 10, 1949.
2 President Truman had appointed Fred Vinson, former Congressman from
Kentucky, Economic Stabilization Director, and Secretary of the Treasury, as Chief
Justice in 1946. His appointment of Harold Burton, Republican Senator from
Ohio, was made in 1945 and was the first Truman Supreme Court appointment.
Justice Burton is now the sole Republican on the Court.
3 The Roosevelt appointees were Hugo Black (1937), Stanley Reed (1938).
Felix Frankfurter (1939), William 0. Douglas (1939), Frank Murphy (1940), James
Byrnes (1941), Robert Jackson (1941), and Wiley Rutledge (1943). All save
Frankfurter, an "independent," were Democrats.
4 Mr. Justice Byrnes resigned in October 1942 to take the important war time
post of Director of Economic Stabilization. He is the present Governor of South
Carolina.
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Men," representing judicial intransigence to the pressures of
a changing, impersonal industrial society, gave way to the
more amenable "Roosevelt Court," has been set down in
complete and scholarly fashion by others.5 Suffice to say that
the story they have told reaffirms once again that the "Con-
stitution is what the Supreme Court says it is." I Socio-eco-
nomic change received a belated, but nevertheless, unmis-
takable judicial imprimatur of constitutionability at the hands
of the reconstructed Rooseveltian Supreme Court. However,
with only five of the original Roosevelt appointees still left
on the Court, and four of President Truman's selections now
their colleagues, the time has come to reassess -the position
of the Court as the guardian of American liberties and the
authoritative diviner of Constitutional law. This is appro-
priate even though the Truman appointees are still in a minor-
ity by one. For the alleged "rubber stamp" judges who re-
ceived the Rooseveltian nod proved to be anything but ob-
sequious. Instead, a flood of five to four opinions, with special
dissents and concurrences in part, and intra-court personality
clashes, often spilling over into the pages of the national press,
have proved that judicial harmony on the Roosevelt Supreme
Court was very rare.' The Roosevelt justices proved to be
independent-minded men who did their own deciding. As a
5 See, e.g., CURTIS, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE (1947); JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE
FOR JUDICIAL SUFREMACY (1941); P ITcnrr, THE ROOSEVELT COURT (1948); and
ROTTSCHAEFER, THE CONsTTruTiow AND SOCIO-EcoNomIc CHANCE (1948).
6 "Any theory of American history which denies the President's duty to exert
political influence upon the Supreme Court is unworthy of its majestic theme. The
Opposition will describe such influence as impious and the Administration will in-
sist it is unthinkable; but it is nevertheless essential to good government in the
United States." AGAR, THE PRICE oF UrioN 492 (1950). It might be added that
it has been practiced by Republicans and Democrats alike. Examine any reputable
history text to see the attempts of the following to influence the Court by their
choice of judicial appointees: John Adams, Andrew Jaclkson, Abraham Lincoln,
Ulysses S. Grant, Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson,
and Franklin D. Roosevelt.
7 Jonathan Daniels reports an anonymous Roosevelt-appointed justice as say-
ing: "Hell, they said the Court lost prestige because we were all Rooseveltian
rubber stamps. Now they are giving us the devil because we are divided." Daniels,
Battle of the Bench, Collier's Magazine, Aug. 17, 1946, p. 12. See also, Thomas
Reed Powell, Behind the Split in the Supreme Court, N. Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1949,
Magazine, p. 13.
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result, a strong division in their ranks early appeared, of
which more will be said later. This division among the Roose-
veltian justices still exists. Clearly, in spite of Professor
Pritchett's prediction in 1948 that the "Roosevelt members
may be expected to dominate the Court for some time to
come," 8 the four Truman appointees now well may occupy
the key position in determining the part that the Court is
to play in future American constitutional development.
Other writers have turned their attention to the judicial
philosophy of Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Burton, the
two earlier Truman appointees.9 The purpose of this article
is to analyze and appraise the work of Justices Clark and
Minton during their first year on the Supreme Court, with
a view to prophesying their probable influence on the imme-
diate course of American constitutional law. Without swal-
lowing completely Justice Holmes' terse definition of law
(i.e., "positive" law) 10 as accurate prediction of "what courts
will do in fact," the comparatively limited evidence furnished
by one term of Court should convince all but the most ardent
abstractionist that constitutional law still has a direct nexus
with the men who interpret and pronounce it.
Before embarking upon discussion of the first term work
of Justices Clark and Minton, a brief summary of the Con-
stitutional decisions and trends which the Roosevelt Court
had produced prior to their elevation to the bench should fur-
nish a logical point of departure. We should be able better
8 PRITCHETr, op. cit. supra note 5, at 11. In fairness to Professor Pritchett it
must be admitted that he qualified ,his prediction by prefacing it with "barring
some holocaust of death."
9 Forrester, Mr. Justice Burton and the Supreme Court, 20 TLA-NE L. Ryv.
1 (1945) ; Secretary Vinson Appointed Chief Justice, 14 U. S. L. WEan 3434 (June
11, 1946).
10 If Holmes' definition meant to embrace "law" in its broad philosophical
sense, including the nature and sources of law, its philosophical roots, and natural
law, etc., then patently it is in error. On the other hand, if the reference was to
judicially promulgated rules of law, including statutory interpretations, it has partial
validity at least. In sjlite of the lack of clarity on the point, the author concurs
in the charitable assumption, that perhaps Holmes meant the latter. See LERNER,
THE MIND AND FAIT OF JUSTICE HoLMES 372 (1943).
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to predict the direction in which the new justices may move
the Court in the future, if we first understand where it is, or
most recently has been.
Paramount among the achievements of the Roosevelt
Court, prior to the 1949-50 term, has been the role it played
as 'an active protector of the political, or civil, rights and
liberties guaranteed to citizens of the United States through
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. Their
predecessors had often invoked the reassuring incantations
of "due process" and natural law to immunize business activ-
ity from federal and state regulation,11 but seldom had seen
fit to apply them in the areas in which they had their genesis,
and where their application has the greatest philosophical
as well as historical justification, i.e., in the field of personal
and political rights, rather than enshrining them in the sanc-
tuaries of laissez-faire and freedom of contract. 2 Be that as
it may, the Roosevelt Court made it clear that they would
pursue a role of judicial activism when examining federal
and state legislation or judicial decisions which attempted to
interfere with the free practice of religion,'" or hinted mildly
at the establishment thereof; 4 restricted freedom of speech 15
11 It has been observed of the non-Scholastic pseudo-natural law that: "No
system of law was better fitted to restrict government to negative functions, to
put property rights on a par with human rights, or to invest existing economic
practices with legal sanction; and from the beginning the dominant forces of
American economy gravitated to the support of natural law: slavery, corpora-
tions, and industrial capitalism." COmwAOER, THE AMERICAN M) 361 (1950).
All of which proves that there is "natural law" and "natural law." For the Catho-
lic view of a true "natural law" philosophy aimed at the protection of the common
good, see ROM-MN, TnE NATURAL LAW (1947). For an interesting treatment of
two kinds of "natural law," the "progressive" and the "conservative," see SToNE,
THE PRovNca AND FuNcTioN oF LAw 237-8 (1950).
12 FREUND, ON UNERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 12 (1950); Warren,
The New "Liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. Rztv. 431 (1926).
13 Tucker v. Texas, 326 U. S. 517, 66 S. Ct. 274, 90 L. Ed. 274 (1946) ; Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501, 66 S. Ct. 276, 90 L. Ed. 265 (1946); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 63 S. Ct. 862, 87 L. Ed. 1313 (1943); Waite, The Debt
of Constitutional Law to Jehovah's Witnesses, 28 Mime. L. REv. 209 (1944). Pritch-
ett has accurately opined that most of the religious liberty questions coming before
the Roosevelt Court have arisen out of the determined and fanatic efforts of
Jehovah's Witnesses, to preach their doctrines to unbelieving and often unwilling
listeners. PncErETr, op. cit. supra note 5, at 93.
14 McColium v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 68 S. Ct. 461, 92 L. Ed.
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or assembly; 16 discriminated in the awarding of the voting
franchise, 7 no matter how subtly conceived,'" or whether
used at the general election or the primary; sanctioned the
enforcement of racial restrictive covenants;' 9 or the racial
discriminations by labor unions. 0 Moreover, in the field of
procedural due process the Court usually had been vigorous
to see that the "search and seizure" clause of the Fourth
Amendment had meaningful content,2 ' and that "due pro-
cess" carried a constitutional realism as a brake on the arbi-
trary action of state law enforcement officers. Failure to pro-
vide counsel in a capital crime, 2 systematic discrimination in
the selection of juries,23 grand and petit, and the involuntary
confession, whether elicited 'by physical 24 or psychological 25
coercion, all were struck down by a Roosevelt Court, which
evidently believed that federal and state powers must be
648 (1948). Comment and criticism, pro and con, appeared in a flood. See the
compendium contained in STRONG, AusIcAr CONSTrIuTIONAL LAW 477 (1950).
For this author's own view on the matter see Scanlan, Book Review, 19 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 114 (1950).
15 For a particularly extreme example of a case where the Court protected
the vile but "free" speech of an unsavory fascist, see Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
U. S. 1, 69 S. Ct. 894, 93 L. Ed. 1131 (1949).
16 Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954, 83 L. Ed. 1423 (1939).
17 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 64 S. Ct. 757, 88 L. Ed. 987 (1944).
18 The "private club" sham failed in Rice v. Elmore, 165 F. (2d) 387 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied. 333 U. S. 875, 68 S. Ct. 905, 92 L. Ed. 1151 (1947). Commented
on in Note, 23 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 210 (1948).
19 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161 (1948); and
Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24, 68 S. Ct. 847, 92 L. Ed. 1187 (1948). This writer
among others, has reviewed the effect of these cases in weakening the cruel Consti-
tutional illusion of "separate but equal." Scanlan, Racial Restrictions in Real
Estate-Property Values Versus Human Values, 24 NoTRE DAME LAw. 157 (1949).
20 Steele v. Louisville & N. R. R. et al., 323 U. S. 192, 65 S. Ct. 226, 89 L. Ed.
173 (1944). See Summers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 COL. L. REv. 33, 49-50
(1947).
21 Trupiano et al. v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, 69 S. Ct. 1229, 92 L. Ed.
1663 (1948). However, there were lapses by the Roosevelt Court from their custo-
mary diligence in the area of the Fourth Amendment. See e. g., Harris v. United
States, 331 U. S. 145, 67 S. Ct. 1098, 91 L. Ed. 1399 (1947).
22 Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U. S. 773, 69 S. Ct. 1247, 93 L. Ed. 1686 (1949).
However, the right still depends on whet-her five judges think the particular cir-
cumstances under which it was deprived amount to a denial of "due process."
Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 62 S. Ct. 1252, 86 L. Ed. 1595 (1942).
23 Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 62 S. Ct. 1159, 86 L. Ed. 1559 (1942).
24 Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 60 S. Ct. 472, 84 L. Ed. 716 (1940).
25 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 69 S. Ct. 1347, 93 L. Ed. 1801 (1949).
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judicially contained when they are invoked in such a way
as to jeopardize personal rights. Without pausing to examine
the divisions among a Roosevelt Court on the question of
whether the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the Bill of
Rights in tot., or only "fundamental liberties of Anglo-Ameri-
can jurisprudence," 26 and merely noting the criticism some-
times provoked by their judicial "activism" in the field of
civil liberties,2" we can put the Roosevelt Court down as the
Supreme Court most diligent in their solicitude for the pres-
ervation of the political liberties of the American citizen
without regard to race, creed or color.
Contrasted to their judicial "activism" in civil rights de-
cisions, the Roosevelt Court pursued a course of Holmesian
tolerance when passing upon the constitutionability of fed-
eral and state regulation of economic activity. Having at-
tempted elsewhere to resolve this paradox 28 the writer will
rest with the reminder that judicial zeal in the field of politi-
cal liberty is not mutually exclusive of a corresponding defer-
ence to legislative restraints imposed by a democratic gov-
ernment for the common good on the excesses and abuses of
an industrial society, which still accepts, in part at least, the
inevitability of a dehumanizing business cycle.29
So the Roosevelt Supreme Court willingly approved of an
extension of .the federal power over commerce, until we safely
could say that it embraced any important economic activity
26 The key case pointing up this disagreement on the content of procedural
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, is Adamson v. California, 332 U. S.
46, 67 S. Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903 (1947). In spite of recent articles supporting
the majority view that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to embrace the
Bill of Rights, justice Black's historical documentation of the minority position in
the Adamson case has great persuasiveness. Compare Fairman and Morrison, Does
the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? 2 SrAn. L. Rv. 5
(1950), with FLcK, THE ADOPTION oF THE FOURTEENTH A. dZ.Nr, (1908).
27 COM MAGER, MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS 71 (1943); Thornton,
Second Class Constitutional Rights, 36 A. B. A. J 640 (1950).
28 Scanlan, The Passing of Justice Murphy-The Conscience of a Court, 25
Nomn Dam LAw. 7 (1949).
29 Barnett, Mr. Justice Murphy, Civil Liberties and the Holmes Tradition, 32
CoRaNL L. Q. 177 (1946).
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affecting a segment of the nation's economy.3" Whether sanc-
tioning the application of the antitrust laws to an "appre-
ciable amount of interstate commerce," "' or approving the
projection of the Fair Labor Standards Act to occupations
far removed from the actual transit of goods in interstate
commerce, 2 the Court had rejected the limitations in the
federal power over commerce and industry which the con-
ceptualisms of their predecessors previously had spun.33
However, while they were willing to reject metaphysics for
facts in supporting the wide sweep of the federal commerce
powers, they were equally partial to a broader exercise of
state powers of regulation 11 and taxation " without running
afoul of the barriers of a judicially 'bloated Commerce Clause.
Likewise did the Court permit broad federal tax 6 and war
30 See, e. g., American Power and Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 67 S. Ct.
133, 91 L. Ed. 103 (1946). It is gravely doubtful if an argument against the con-
stitutionability of federal legislation, based on grounds that the federal power over
commerce does not extend to the case, will ever again be able to sway a majority
of the Supreme Court. Stem, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy,
1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. Ray. 645 (1946).
31 United States v. Yellow Cab Co. et al., 332 U. S. 218, 225, 67 S. Ct. 1560,
91 L. Ed. 2010 (1947).
32 Borden Co. v. Bordella et al., 325 U. S. 679, 65 S. Ct. 1223, 89 L. Ed. 1865
(1945); Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517, 62 S. Ct. 1116, 86 L. Ed. 1638 (1942);
United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 609 ('1941).
33 "We reaffirm once more the constitutional authority resident in Congress
by virtue of the commerce clause to undertake to solve national problems directly
and realistically, giving due recognition to the scope of state power. That follows
from the fact that the federal commerce power is as broad as the economic needs
of the nation." American Power and Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 103, 67 S. Ct.
133, 91 L. Ed. 103 (1946).
34 See, e. g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341, 63 S. Ct. 307, 87 L. Ed., 315
(1943), and the cases discussed in Chapter 2, The Expansion of Federal Powers
Since 1933, of RoscHAEFER, op. cit. supra note 5.
35 Two recent examples of the Court's realistic recognition that the states'
powers to tax should not be stifled by Commerce Clause conceptualism, if they are
to somehow obtain the revenue needed to preserve their place in our federal system,
are Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80, 68 S. Ct. 1475, 92 L. Ed. 1832
(1948), and Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Commissioners; 332 U. S.
495, 68 S. Ct. 167, 92 L. Ed. 99 (1947). However, even with the Roosevelt Court,
ancient formulae sometimes prevailed over the harsh appreciation that the individ-
ual states must raise revenue from somewhere. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249,
67 S. Ct. 274, 91 L. Ed. 265 (1946).
36 See representative cases collected in DowiUm, CAsES oN CoNsTITUvioNAL
LAW 384-420 (4th ed. 1950).
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powers 11 to receive their approval, with only sporadic re-
fusals to concur on several occasions when the power asserted
entered the special "holy of holies" prohibited by the Court,
i.e., civil liberties. 8
Turning to the field of labor relations, it is clear that the
Roosevelt Court had regarded with approval, and often with
thinly disguised satisfaction, federal and state action which
gave statutory sanction to collective bargaining, 9 immunized
the boycott,4" and took from picketing the "illegal purpose"
label affixed to it at common law,41 to give to it in exchange
the constitutional glamour of "free speech." 42 However,
alert students of the Court could have prophesied accurately,
even before the 1949-50 Term of Court, that reasonable State
laws outlawing the closed and union shop nevertheless would
pass Constitutional muster with the Roosevelt Court, in spite
of any pro-labor sympathies that inhibited some of its mem-
bers.43
37 See, e. g., Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U. S. 160, 68 S. Ct. 1429, 92 L. Ed. 1881
(1948). (sustaining presidential power of removal of enemy aliens); Silesian-
American Corporation v. Clark, 322 U. S. 680, 64 S. Ct. 1233, 88 L. Ed. 1534 (1944)
(sustaining seizure order of the Enemy Alien Property Custodian) ; and, of course,
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 64 S. Ct. 641, 88 L. Ed. 892 (1944) (uphold-
ing federal Tent control as a proper exercise of the war power).
38 Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U. S. 304, 66 S. Ct. 606, 90 L. Ed. 688 (1946),
14 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 522 (1946), reaffirming Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L.
Ed. 281 (U. S. 1866), and the "open court" rule.
39 Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U. S. 103, 57 S. Ct. 650, 81 L. Ed. 953
(1937) ; NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed.
893 (1937) ; and see cases synopsized in SmI=, LABOR LAw 119-33 (1950).
40 American Federation of Labor et al. v. Swing et al, 312 U. S. 321, 61 S. Ct
568, 85 L. Ed. 855 (1940). Whether the Taft-Hartley Act forbids all secondary
boycotts, and, assuming it does, whether such a prohibition is constitutional have
not been resolved as yet by the Court. Although the language of Section 8(b)
of the Taft-Hartley Act, supported by parts of the legislative history, might seem to
indicate that all secondary boycotts were outlawed, it is open to doubt whether the
Court will go that far. For if it does, it must face up to the constitutional issue.
41 See, e. g., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077 (1896). The
perspicacious Oliver Wendell Holmes dissented.
42 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093 (1940).
43 The retreat from picketing as pure "free speech" set in soon after the Thorn-
hill case. Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U. S. 287, 61 S.
Ct. 552, 85 L. Ed. 836 (1941); Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritters
Cafe, 315 U. S. 722, 62 S. Ct. 807, 86 L. Ed. 1178 (1942). "To exalt all labor union
conduct in restraint of trade above all state control would greatly reduce the tra-
ditional powers of states over their domestic economy and might conceivably make
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The Court which reached the results summarily described
in the preceding paragraphs was far from unanimous in
achieving them. It had two main opposing alignments, each
claiming to be the legitimate heir of the Holmes tradition
of proper judicial self-restraint. The Frankfurter-acksin
team numbered those who believed that judicial deference to
legislative will was not a part-time affair, but one which should
be adhered to even when that will was exercised in restraint
of a civil liberty." Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy and
Rutledge felt otherwise; legislative supremacy in their think-
ing was not to be honored when it was used to strike at the
very postulates upon which it rested, i.e., free thought, free
speech, free assembly, freedom of religion, and non-discrim-
ination in the exercise of the voting franchise." It was not
that ranks were not sometimes crossed with a consequent
shifting of the line-up of judges in many decisions.46 Yet the
basic division remained, and on the eve of the 1949-50 Term
it was there still. However, Justices Black and Douglas had
lost through death the articulate aid and the support which
Justices Murphy and Rutledge had provided so often. It had
been a persuasive combination, which, more often than not,
could swerve one or more of the remaining justices to pro-
duce a majority of the Court, and thus become an "infallible
five" whose pronouncements were the law of the land, the
it impossible for them to enforce their anti-trade-restraint laws." Justice Black
speaking in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, 497, 69 S. Ct. 684,
93 L. Ed. 834 (1949).
44 See Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S.
77, 95, 69 S. Ct. 448, 93 L. Ed. 513 (1949). KONEFSKY, THE CONSTirUTIONAL
WORLD OF MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, 116 (1949).
45 Scanlan, supra note 28. FRANK, MR. JUSTICE BLACK: THE MAN AND His
OPINIONS 137 (1949), reviewed by Scanlan, Book Review 25 NoTRE DAM LAW.
190 (1949).
46 For instance, Justice Frankfurter, although normally taking the position
that civil liberties are not on any preferred plane of constitutional protection, often
joined Justices Murphy'and Rutledge in protesting against decisions of the Court
which appeared to them to be sapping the "search and seizure" concept of vitality
as a fundamental element of due process. On the other -hand, Justice Black, one
time police court judge and an investigator of a Senate Committee, often left his
liberal colleagues to occupy the spot that Justice Frankfurter vacated in the "search
and seizure" cases. See Reynard, Freedom From Unreasonable Search and Seizure
-A Second Class Constitutional Right?, 25 IND. L. J. 259, 260 (1950).
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"befuddled four" to the contrary notwithstanding. Now let
us turn to the trail as it is picked up at the 1949-50 Term.
Justices Clark and Minton occupy the seats vacated 'by the
late Justices Murphy and Rutledge. Theoretically, under a
"government of laws and not of men," this change of judicial
personnel should not affect the immutable verities of con-
stitutional law. That may be so, but a constitution, as Wood-
row Wilson once remarked of government, "is as good as the
men to whom it is entrusted." Let us see how the two new-
comers to high judicial place are executing that trust.
II.
Pre-Supreme Court Experience of Justices Clark and Minton
The appointment of Tom Clark, then Attorney General,
to the Supreme Court was not too favorably received, on the
whole, by the press and commentators of the nation.47 If
a general criticism was most prevalent it was the one that
ascribed the appointment to the President's sometimes per-
verse habit of generously rewarding political loyalty by the
bestowing of a public office on one whose capabilities to meas-
ure up to the honor thus received were open to question.4"
However, perhaps the President was aware that the same dis-
dainful view had often been taken of his own abilities by
critics whom he thought he had lived to confound.49
The varied legal experiences that Justice Clark brought to
the Supreme Court may provide a background out of which
a fine judge could emerge. Tom Clark, World War I veteran,
a product of Virginia Military Institue and Texas Law
47 The appointment of Justice Clark came as quite a surprise, since it had
been assumed that the President would appoint a Catholic to succeed Justice
Murphy.
48 However, this is a common criticism when presidents appoint men who
they believe will be sympathetic to the policies of the existing administration.
Moreover, it seems to be an old American custom to appoint politically trustworthy
judges.
49 Although his early days in the White House did not indicate it, President
Truman certainly can not be characterized as a "weak" executive.
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School, practiced law in Dallas for a number of years. Dur-
ing part of that time he was Civil District Attorney for Dallas
County. Coming to Washington in 193 7 when the New Deal's
crusading tide had reached its flood stage and was beginning
to recede, he joined the Department of Justice as an attor-
ney, and worked his way up to Attorney General in 1945.50
Among the diversified roles in which he served were, War
Risk Litigation attorney, special assistant (Antitrust) to the
Attorney General, Coordinator of Alien Enemy Control, Chief
of the Civilian Staff of Japanese War Relocation, Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, and
later, of the Criminal Division.
Perhaps these many services on the side of federal law
enforcement may have inculcated in him an appreciation of
the difficulties which face the Government, as prosecutor, and
produced a bias in favor of granting a wide sweep for the
powers of that Government. His antitrust background may
loom as a key to his position in the future complex monopoly,
patent, and unfair competition cases that continue to come
before the Court. His connection with the Japanese exclusion
cases ZI may be an important factor in formulating his atti-
tude in the difficult job of marking the line where free speech,
press, and assembly end, and the legitimate anti-subversive
regulatory powers of the national and state governments be-
gin. Those who regard the Japanese exclusion cases as a most
dangerous precedent in support of possible future oppressive
government invasions of the sphere of free thought pro-
tected by the First Amendment, will not take too much heart
50 Thus Clark cannot be classified, purely and simply, as a "New Dealer,"
even by those who use the term loosely, and usually in a derogatory manner. He
was rather a "middle of the road New Dealer" whose political fortunes flowered
when he received the helpful support of Fred Vinson, now Chief justice of the
Supreme Court.
51 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 65 S. Ct. 193, 89 L. Ed. 194
(1949); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 63 S. Ct. 1375, 87 L. Ed. 1774
(1943). These dangerous precedents sustained executive curfew and exclusion
orders applicable to American citizens of Japanese descent.
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from Justice Clark's connection with these cases -and the tra-
gic story behind them. 2
During his tenure as an Attorney General he achieved a
number of notable legal -ictories including a triumph over
John L. Lewis,5" a successful antitrust prosecution -against
the monopolistic structure of the motion picture industry,54
the splendid achievement of, the racial -restrictive covenant
cases,55 and his somewhat reluctant triumph for the-national
interest in the tidelands oil case. 6 In his opinions as-Attor-
ney General he took a broad view of the scope of the national
war and treaty powers.5 7 However, in contrast to the vigor-
ous anti-monopoly position which he had assumed as anti-
trust prosecutor, his official opinion advising the War Assets
Corporation that the proposed sale of the Geneva steel plant
in California to the already powerful United States Steel Cor-
poration did not violate the'Sherman Act,5" became a pivotal
factor in the later United States v. Columbia Steel Co. Case,59
a decision which many feel was a judicial lapse from the
Court's usual awareness of the dangers of the "Curse of Big-
ness." 60
52 On the other hand, they may take some reassurance by recalling that what
a lawyer must do as an advocate in the service of his clients is not always a fair
indication of how he may behave in a similar situation when hisrole is that of
judge. Let them remember it was justice Brown, formerly a successful corporation
lawyer, who delivered a sharp dissent in the income, tax cases, declaring- that the
decision involved "nothing less than a surrender of the taxing power to the moneyed
class." Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 158 U. S. 601, 695, 15 S. Ct. 912,
39 L. Ed. 1108 (1895). -
53 United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U. S. 258, 67 S. Ct.
677, 91 L. Ed. 884 (1947). ; - I -
54 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. et al., 334 U. S. 131, 68 S. Ct.
915, 92 L. Ed. 1260 (1948).
55 Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S., 24, 68 S. Ct. 847, 92 L. Ed. 1187 (1948) ; Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161 (1948).
56 United States v. California; 332 U. S. 19, 67 S. Ct. 1658, 91 L. Ed. 1889
(1947). Harold Ickes claims, in a typical Ickesian stricture, that when "Tom Clark
was Attorney General he refused to file suit against California until President Tru-
man made him do it." Ickes, Need Jvstice Be Deaf and Dumb, 123 New Re-
public Oct. 2, 1950, p. 17 (1950).
- 57- 14 U. S. L. WE=: 2165 (Sept. 11,1945).
58 See United States, v. Columbia Steel Co. et al., 334 U. S. 495, 505, 68 S. Ct.
1107, 92 L. Ed. 1533 (1948).
59 334 U. S. 495, 68 S.-Ct. 1107, 92 L; Ed.-1533 (1948).--
60 See Justice Douglas' dissent, id., 334 U. S. at 534.
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Rewarded by the President for his fine work as Attorney
General and for his loyalty under fire during the 1948 presi-
dential election campaign, Justice Clark approached his first
term of Court as a man of whom a good deal might be assayed.
An efficient prosecutor, attuned to the political realities of
his times, possessing a grasp of orthodox antitrust law, even
if he misapplied it in an important instance, partial to strong
federal powers, even at the expense sometimes of individual
freedom, Tom Clark, nevertheless, showed real courage in
pushing for the civil rights program of his President, at the
risk of alienating his Texas backers, and demonstrated he
was no slave to the abstraction of "states rights" at the ex-
pense of human rights. All in all, Justice Clark, although
having acquired no previous judicial experience, still had par-
ticipated in creditable style in the pressing events of the nine-
teen-forties. His performance could raise up the hope that
his record as a Supreme Court Justice might at least be ad-
mirable, if not brilliant.
The public reaction to the appointment of Sherman Minton
was similar to that which greeted the appointment of Justice
Clark a short time before.6" However, in addition to the re-
sentment of high honors allegedly allocated on the mundane
basis of political loyalty and friendship, there was an addi-
tional criticism voiced. Back in the halcyon days of the middle
thirties, Minton had been a strong supporter of President
Roosevelt's programs. In particular, some hostile writers re-
called his active leadership in supporting the President's
"Court packing" scheme. A short-lived attempt was made to
have him appear before the Senate Judiciary Committee
which was then considering the appointment.
On the other hand, satisfaction was expressed in some quar-
ters that the President had at last given recognition to a lower
federal court judge instead of appointing a law professor,
61 18 U. S. L. WE= 3098 (Oct. 11, 1949).
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government lawyer, or member of Congress.62 Some com-
mentators naively thought that Minton's appointment was
an addition to the liberal wing of the Court.63 These pre-
cipitous prognosticators should have taken a closer look at
Minton's record on the seventh circuit before thus hailing
him as an addition to the Black-Douglas branch of the Court.
Moreover, it seems accurate to say that the charge that Min-
ton was a "rubber stamp Senator" during his term in Con-
gress contained at least a grain of truth. Some hint that his
liberalism was of a type not uncommon among aspiring Demo-
cratic politicians of the McNutt era, i.e., useful when the pro-
gressive tide was flowing strongly, but easily discarded for
a more conservative approach if the occasion, and the elec-
tion returns, might demand it.
At any rate, his record as a federal judge of itself would
not allow any unequivocal appraisal to be made of his judicial
philosophy. However, just as Justice Clark's pre-Supreme
Court experiences would seem to have stamped him as one
who gives a broad play to the reins of government, so too
did circuit court Justice Minton reveal in his opinions a simi-
lar disposition. Thus, he confirmed a lower court opinion
holding that the Great A. & P. Company had violated the
anhtitrust laws by, inter alia, the misuse of its mass buying
power.64 In addition, he concurred in the rigid Conduit de-
cision " which prohibited the individual maintenance of a
"losing part price" system with knowledge that others also
maintained them. On occasion, he had demonstrated that he
shares the view of those who would strictly contain the scope
of the legal patent monopoly and would not allow it to be used
as a leverage to crack the anti-monopoly dike.66 Finally, at
62 The failure of presidents in recent years to reward able circuit court of
appeals' judges by elevating them to the Supreme Court is inexcusable.
63 Harold Ickes was one of these.
64 United States v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 173 F. (2d) 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
65 Triangle Conduit and Cable Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 168 F. (2d)
175 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U. S. 956, 69 S. Ct. 888, 93 L. Ed. 1110 (1948).
66 Chicago Metallic Co. v. Edward Katzinger Co., 139 F. (2d) 291 (7th Cir.),
affd, 329 U. S. 394, 67 S. Ct. 416, 91 L. Ed. 374 (1943).
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least one of his opinions indicated that he was not hostile to
flexible administrative action by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion.7 - Moreover, several other of Justice Minton's opinions
while on the seventh circuit, revealed a certain humanitarian,
strain which he would allow to override legal technicalities in
order to achieve equity in a particular case, particularly in
labor cases. 8 On the other hand, he did hand down rulings
against the Secretary of Agriculture 69 and the NLRB,7 and
concurred in a seventh circuit decision sustaining the -"non-
Communist" affidavits under the Taft-Hartley Act as a valid
exercise of Congressional Power.7
Since Justice Minton's judicial background probably of-
fered the most reliable barometer of his possible behavior as
a Supreme Court Justice, the writer will only mention in pass-
ing the fact that his early career included military service in
World War I, high: scholastic honors at Indiana and Yale law
schools, private practice in Indiana,: a term as attorney for
the Public Utilities Commission of Indiana, and a successful
election run for United States Senator. Reference previously
has been made to his career in the Senate, where, in addition
to supporting most administration legislation and policy, he
became a close friend and supporter of Senator Hugo Black,
now his senior associate in the Court.
7 2
Evaluating the pre-Supreme Court background of Justice
Minton, it is surprising how his views seem to correspond
closely to those that we have vouchsafed of Justice Clark.
He appears as a politician, aware of the popular and per-
suasive tides of the moment, a man who realizes that a Twen-
tieth Century Federal Government must be 'granted the
capacity to govern in a way that permits it to solve some of
67 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 174 F. (2d) 703 (7th Cir. 1949).
68 See, e. g., Tovar v. Jarecki, 173 F. (2d) 449 (7th Cir. 1949).
69 General Foods Corporation v. Brannan, 170 F. (2d) 220 (Ith Cir. 1948),
setting aside an order of the Secretary of Agriculture based on a charge that General
Foods Corporation was manipulating commodity prices.
70 Sax v. NLRB, 171 F. (2d) 769 (7th Cir. 1948).
71 Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F. (2d) 247 (7th Cir. 1948).
72 FRANK, op. cit. supra note 45, at 96.
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the pressing problems, and eliminate the graver abuses that
industrial society of necessity must breed. Veteran :of Con-
gressional service, including astint as chairman of the Senate
Committee on Lobbying, he may be likely, much like his
friend, Justice Black, to recall the obstacles that confront
efficient use of governmental investigative and enforcement
powers. Like Justice Clark, he has demonstrated loyalty and
courage under fire, -although it was much easier to wear in
the Senate of 1937 the badge of liberalism, than it was when
Justice Clark proved his mettle in the, 1943 election cam-
paign. Unfortunately, Justice Minton's views on civil rights,
whatever they may be, ha-not been revealed to any certain
extent at the time of his appointment. However, recalling
his acute political instinct, it would have been a fair observa-
tion to say that he would go as far, and no further, as the
majority of the Court in supporting the principle of non-dis-
crimination in the field of civil liberties.
III. - .
The Power to Govern (Federal)
Turning to a review'of thework of Justices Clark and Min-
ton during their initial term on the Court first reference will
be made to cases treating of federal regulatory measures. The
new Justices and their colleaguies were faced with fewer cases
involving either constitutional or statutory 'questions in the
field of federal regulation of business.' 3 One possible expla--
nation maybe that themajority of *federal statutes regulating
economic activity have been on the books since 1938, aside--
from the temporary legislation passed during the War period.
It may be that "creeping'sotialism," or the "Welfare State,"
New Deal brand, is now accepted by business, :at least to the
extent that the "government by law suit" approach, is being
discarded for awhile, since that technique has not achieved the
73 18 U. S. L. W=K 3345 (June 20, 1950).
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results it once promised. Thus, the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 74
one of the last of the statutory reforms of the Roosevelt ad-
ministration, was interpreted by the Court to embrace a gas
company engaged solely in the business of local distribution
of natural gas produced outside of the state, although the gas
was transported by the distributing company from the state
line entirely within its own high pressure pipelines. 5 The
Court, by a five to two decision, construed the Natural Gas
Act to cover the separate functions of "sale" and "transpor-
tation" of gas in interstate commerce. The Court felt that
the instant case was one of the latter category. The opinion
was written by Justice Black, usually a friend of federal pro-
tection of the consumer; the two new justices, one a former
public utility commission attorney, and the other a former
federal prosecutor and Attorney General, joined the five man
majority. Justice Douglas, still recuperating from a severe
fall from a horse which disabled him for the great portion
of the Term, took no part in the consideration of -the case.
The familiar team of Frankfurter and Jackson dissented.
Again, the new justices were sympathetic as a Court ma-
jority allowed the Federal Employer's Liability " and the
Federal Safety Appliance Acts " broad coverage by following
as it were, an "equity of fulfillment" canon of construction,
to hold in one case that the FEL Act prohibited the railroad
from limiting by agreement the forum in which an injured
worker may maintain a suit.78 In another, the Court con-
strued the FSA Act to mean that failure of an automatic
coupling pin is per se an actionable wrong without regard to
74 52 STAT. 821 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 717 (1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 459
(1947), 15 U. S. C. § 717f (Supp. 1950).
75 Federal Power Commission v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U. S. 464, 70 S. Ct.
266, 94 L. Ed.....(1950).
76 35 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§ 51 et seq. (1946), 62 STAT.
989 (1948), 45 U. S. C. § 56 (Supp. 1950).
77 27 STAT. 531 (1893), as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§ 1 et seq. (1946), 61 STAT.
120 (1947), 45 U. S. C. §§ 25-27 (Supp. 1950).
78 Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R. R., 338 U. S. 263, 70 S. Ct. 26, 94 L. Ed.
.... (1949).
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proof of care, diligence, or lack of proximate cause."9 Finally,
Justice Clark wrote a majority opinion in Affolder v. New
York, C. & St. L. R. R., 0 reaffirming the proposition that the
duty of a carrier under the automatic coupler requirement of
the Safety Appliance Act is unrelated to negligence, but is
an absolute one. Clearly the .new justices seem disposed to
read social legislation in a manner that attains the broad
social ends to which, presumably, it was directed. In con-
trast, the old "New Dealers," Frankfurter and Jackson
quibble with this approach and continue to take refuge in the
rigidities of the limited word tools with which legislative
draftsmen seem doomed to ply their trade."'
There were several other decisions of the 1949-50 Term
in which the two new justices joined a majority of the Court
to uphold a broad federal power of regulation. In Ewing v.
Mytinger & Casselberry,2 the Court sustained the multiple
seizure provision of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, 3 holding that due process did not require a hearing as
a prerequisite to the administrative finding of probable cause
for the multiple seizures of misbranded articles which endan-
gered the public health, since the owner of the seized articles
would have an opportunity to secure a full hearing before
a court when the libels (seizure orders) are filed. While Jus-
tice Minton joined the majority, Justice Clark did not par-
ticipate. (This was to be the situation in a substantial num-
ber of cases, since Justice Clark had participated directly or
indirectly as Attorney General in many of the cases reaching
the Court in the 1949-50 Term.) The Ewing case seems to
79 O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 338 U. S. 384, 70 S. Ct. 200, 94 L. Ed.
(1949).
80 339 U S.96, 70 S. Ct. 509,94 L. Ed.....(1950).
81 See, e. g., Federal Power Commission v. East Ohio Gas Co. et al., 338 U. S.
464, 70 S. Ct. 266, 94 L. Ed _... (1950), where Justice Jackson in dissent, joined by
Justice Frankfurter, argued for a restricted interpretation of the Natural Gas Act
which would exclude from federal jurisdiction the high pressure distribution lines.
82 339 U.S. 594, 70S. Ct. 870,94 L. Ed. .- (1950).
83 52 STAT. 1044 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 334(a) (1946), as amended, 62 STAT.
582 (1948), 21 U. S. C. § 334(a) (Supp. 1950).
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recognize a distinction between the Constitutional necessity
of affording a hearing in the case of property seizure, when a
-later judicial hearing will be granted, and the case of deten-
tion of the person.84 Justices Frankfurter and Jackson dis-
sented, being of the opinion that the seizure itself was suffici-
ent injury to the business of the claimant as to acquire, in the
interests of due process, a pre-seizure administrative hear-
ing.85 1 ;
Again in Civil Aeronautics Board v. State Airlines, Inc.,"8
the Court, with Justices Clark and Minton aligning' them-
selves with the majority, upheld the authority of the CAB
to award aircarriers in consolidated area proceedings air
routes not specifically requested in the carrier's applications.
And in Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Refining
Co.,87 the Court sustained an order of the Secretary of Agri-
culture making an allotment of sugar among refiners operat-
ing in Puerto Rico. While the majority opinion by Justice
Frankfurter recognized that although the quotas may work
individual unfairness on late-comers to the industry, the Court
was "not a tribunal for relief from the crudities and iniquities
of completed experimental economic legislation." 88
Concluding a summary of the new Court's attitude toward
federal regulation of business brief mention of several anti-
trust cases will aid in completing the 'picture. In United
States v. Yellow Cab Co."9 the Court sustained the trial court
holding that the circumstances surrounding a merger of cab
manufacturing and cab operating companies did not warrant
a finding that there was an intent to violate the Sherman Act.
Justice Minton agreed with the majority opinion while Jus-
tice Clark did not participate. As the vigorous dissenting opin-
84 For a full treatment of the problem of summary administrative notice and
hearing, see GELLHomf, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 283-320 (1947).
85 339 U. S. at 602.
86 338 U. S. 572, 70 S. Ct. 379, 94 L. Ed..... (1950).
87 338 U. S. 604, 70 S. Ct. 403, 94 L. Ed. (1950).
s8 Id., 338 U. S. at 618.
'9 338 U. S. 338, 70 S. Ct. 177, 94 L. Ed. (1949).
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ion of Justices Black and-Reed pointed out, the~trial court de-
cision assumed that a formed; or specific, intent was an indis-
pensable element .of the crime, of monopoly or attempted
monopoly under-" Section ,2 of the. Sherman Act,90 , whereas
several important Supreme Court.decisions previously seemed
to have established the objective, or general intent, standard
as all that need be spelled out by the facts in such cases."
To the extent that the second Yellw Cab decision holds
otherwise, the obstacles to successful prosecution of monopo-
listic mergers under Section 2 of- the Sherman Act, may have
been increased. On the,, other hand, the majority, opinion
contributes to -the line of decisions that implement Rule-52
of, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires an,
appellate court, to give due regard "to, the opportunity of the-
trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses." To that-
extent, it is a reflection of an attitude of judicial,"self-re-
straint." 92 The Roosevelt Court had quite often. abandoned,
their Holnesian tolerance when,'examining antitrust cases.931
The new Court now may, have indicated a reluctance to do
that.
However, the Court, did- hand down one antitrust-decision
holding that -the business of a ,real estate agent is, included
in the word -"trade"within the meaning of Section 3 of the
Sherman Act, and overruled the defense that. when personal
services are involved a combination to fix real -estate broker-
age commissions by a District of Columbia Real Estate Board
was legal.94 While Justice Clark did not participate, Justice
Minton joined the. Douglas-Black group toconcur in this
90 Id., 338 U. S. at 342.
IY" See, e. g.; United States v. 'Giffith, 334 U. S. i00, 68 5S. Ct. 941, 92 L. Ed.
1236 (1948). - . .... . .
92 This faith in an alleged ability on the part of trial court judges may often
be unwarranted. See FRANx, CouRTs ON TRIAL (19 ),'reviewed by Scanlan, Book
Review, 25 NoTRE DARIE LAW.' 396 (1950).
93 See, e. g., Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute et al., 333 U. -S.
683, 68'S. Ct. 793, 92 L. Ed. 1010 (1948).
94 United States v. National Association of Real Estate IBoards, 339 'U. S. 485,
70 S. Ct. 711, 94 L. Ed .... (1950).
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broad interpretation of "trade." The rationale that most real
estate -brokers are entrepeneurs engaged in business for a
profit seems more in accordance with the realities of the real
estate field than the analogies to ordinary industrial labor on
which Justice Jackson relied in dissent. 5
However, Justices Clark and Minton demonstrated that
they did not share completely the antitrust fervor of Justices
Black and Douglas, in which the late Justices Murphy and
Rutledge usually shared. This was apparent in several patent
cases in which the Court had to consider the proper delinea-
tion of where the legal patent monopoly ends and the illegal
monopoly begins. In Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc.96 the Court, with Justice Minton writing the
majority opinion, refused to apply the doctrine of misuse
of patents to a fact situation where the licensee was required
to pay royalties based on its sales even though none of the
patents licensed were used. Justice Black, joined by Justice
Douglas, who always is sensitive to the slightest attempts to
extend a legal monopoly into prohibited areas, reminded the
Court of previous decisions which had the effect of prohibit-
ing the owner of a patent to use his patents in such a way as
"to bludgeon his way into a partnership with his licensee,"
by collecting royalties on unpatented as well as patented
articles.9 The minority thought that the facts of the instant
case fell within the reason behind that rule, while Justice
Minton, speaking for the majority, thought the principle of
the previous tie-in cases could not "be contorted to circum-
scribe the instant situation. . .. The right to a patent includes
the right to market the use of the patent at reasonable re-
turns." 98 Justice Minton seems to have ignored the fact that
95 Id., 338 U. S. at 496.
96 339 U.s. 827, 70S. Ct. 894, 94 L. Ed... (1950).
97 Especially fresh in the Court's memory should have been United States v.
United States Gypsum Co. et al., 333 U. S. 364, 68 S. Ct. 525, 92 L. Ed. 746 (1948) ;
United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U. S. 287, 68 S. Ct. 550, 92 L. Ed. 701
(1948). See an excellent discussion of these two cases in, Note, 23 NoTRm DaM
LAW. 547 (1948).
98 339 U. S. at 833.
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the patentee in the instant case was using the leverage of his
patent monopoly to obtain a share of the market that would
not otherwise be his. Such an extension of itself may not be
a violation of the Sherman Act, but it appears to be the type
of misuse of patents that the Court had prohibited in the
past.
99
In another patent case, the Court restricted the sweep of
the Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker decision,0 0
which had been rendered at the previous term of Court.
That case had deeply upset the patent bar 'by holding that
a claim for a combination mechanical patent, describing the
most critical element of the patent in terms of what it will do,
rather than in terms of its physical characteristics, is invalid
as functional. The new Court modified the effect of that
holding by deciding that the Halliburton rule is not appli-
cable to a combination patent in which the inventive unique-
ness inheres in the combination, rather than in any particular
element.' 1 Justice Black, always skeptical of broad patent
claims, dissented, while Justices Clark and Minton again in-
dicated they do not share this skepticism toward patentees
by associating themselves in the per curiam majority opinion.
Finally, in Graver Tank lanufacturing Ca. v. Linde Air
Products Co.,o2 the Court, with Justice Clark one of the ma-
jority, and Justice Minton abstaining upheld the patent law
doctrine of "equivalents" and applied it broadly. The doc-
trine of equivalents means that a patent need not be copied
in every detail before it will be protected from the attempted
infringement. Reasoning logically, the Court held that,
since "outright and forthright duplication" of a patent is a
rare type of infringement, "to prohibit no other would place
the inventor at the mercy of verbalism and would be sub-
ordinating substance to form." 103 The Court's proper appre-
99 See note 97 supra.
100 329 U.S. 1,67 S. Ct. 6,91 L. Ed. 3 (1946).
101 Faulkner v. Gibbs, 338 U. S. 267, 70 S. c t. 25, 94 L. Ed..... (1949).
102 339 U.S. 605, 70S. Ct. 854, 94 L. Ed. - (1950).
103 Id., 339 U. S. at 607.
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ciationi.in this case of the dangers of substituting an empty
verbalism for the realities of the fact situation contrasts with
their rejection of the same approach in the Hazeltine case,104
where application of it perhaps would have resulted in classi-
fying the patentee's conduct as a misuse of his patent.
Concluding the analysis of the attitude of the new Justices
toward the federal powers of regulation, including antitrust
and the related field of patent law, we may say that the two
new Justices share almost identical views on the subject.
While Justice Clark participated in fewer decisions because
of his connection with several of them as Attorney General,
both he and Justice Minton have given substantial evidence
that they do not take a niggardly view of the scope of federal
regulatory statutes. This is especially true when the statutes
before them for construction have a broad humanitarian
objective, such as a Safety Appliance Act. Such statutes they
will interpret broadly. On the other hand, they have given
some manifestation that, while they possess a grasp of ortho-
dox antitrust concepts, they will not be quick to. extend them
to new situations. Moreover, they feel that trial court find-
ings in antitrust cases are entitled to very favorable considera-
tion by appellate courts, in spite of the fact that in previous
decisions the Roosevelt Court often had manifested an eager-
ness to review the facts. Finally, both Justices Minton and
Clark have indicated, that in the clash of argument as to
where the patent monopoly ends and the antitrust violation
begins, they will throw their weight in the close case on the
side of the patentee. The new Justices seem to have no quar-
rel with the statutor.- prerequisites of an industrial democ-
racy, but they will not volunteer too much of their judicial
initiative in seeing to it that the statutes are pushed to cover
novel situations. Theirs is a tolerant, orthodox liberalism,
no more, and no less.
104 See note 96 supra.
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IV.
The Power To Tax
The cases decided at the 1949-50 Term which involved
questions of federal and state taxation were not too numer-
ous. Nor did they raise fundamental questions of the per-
missible scope of the federal or state powers in the field. How-
ever, if any trend in the tax cases could be detected at all, it
was one that favored the taxpayer, for a change., The new
Justices played an important part in the tax decisions; and
if- we can say the Court displayed a more receptive attitude
toward the tax. "loopholes" on which petitioning taxpayers
.relied in their appeals, it was the Truman Court which was
mainly responsible.. The Truman appointees (Burton, Vin-
son, Clark, and Minton) wrote all but one of the tax opinions
handed down at the 1949-50 Term.
-In Brown. -Shoe. Co. v. Commissioner of Infernat Reve-
nue,... Justice Clark wrote a majority opinion in-which Jus-
tice Minton, among others, joined.- The Court held that cor-
porations -which received property as an inducement to locate
their plant-in a particular town or community, were entitled
to deduct depreciation on such property in determining their
excess profits income, These transfers by the inducing com-
munities were "contributions to capital," and thus deductible,
said Justice Clark,, apparently following a somewhat auto-
matic "plain meaning" canon of construction to reach the
result. .The Bureau of Internal Revenue had argued for the
more specialized restricted meaning of legal "capital," or
capital actually invested or "paid-in"' by the taxpayer. Al-
,though the rule is otherwise in the case of public utilities, ' 6
Justice Clark's opinion distinguished that situation, and the
former public utility commission counsel, Justice Minton,
found no trouble in going along with an opinion that sapped
105 339 U. S. 583, 70S. Ct. 820, 94 L. Ed _... (1950).
106 Detroit Edison Co. Y. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 319 U. S. 98,
63 S. Ct. 902, 87 L. Ed. 1286 (1943).
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the old war-time excess profits tax of some of its vitality.
Legislative draftsmen concerned with the drafting of a new
excess profits law might take heed.
In another tax case, Commissioner v. Korell,117 the Tru-
man Court again pursued the "plain meaning" canon of
statutory construction to hold, that the term "amortizable
bond premiums," as used in the Internal Revenue Code, in-
cluded a bond premium paid for a conversion privilege, and
allowed the claimed deduction, even though the Government
had argued that the statute meant to permit deductions only
for true bond premiums. Justice Vinson wrote the opinion,
in which both Justices Minton and Clark agreed. And in the
important decision of United States v. Cumberland Public
Service Co.,' a unanimous Court held that a corporation is
not liable for income tax on the sale of corporate assets which
first were transferred to its stockholders in partial liquida-
tion, and then sold, when the corporation was in fact dis-
solved, where the trial court had found that the sale was
actually made by the stockholders and not the corporation,
notwithstanding the fact that the trial court also had deter-
mined that the prime motive of the stockholders was to re-
duce taxes. Strangely enough, Justice Black wrote the unani-
mous opinion of the Court, whereas in the Brown Shoe and
Korell cases he had been a lonely minority of one. Justice
Black was willing to sustain in the Cumberland case the trial
court's findings that this was a genuine dissolution, in con-
trast to his attitude in the Yellow Cab antitrust decision, dis-
cussed supra,"0 9 where he had expressed dissatisfaction with
the trial court's decision that the merger questioned in that
case was one entered into for genuine business reasons and
not with an intent to violate the Sherman Act. This time,
107 339 U.S. 619, 70S. Ct. 905,94 L. Ed.... (1950).
108 338 U.s. 451, 70 S. Ct. 280,94 L. Ed....(1950).
109 See note 90 supra. Justice Black usually ,has manifested a view of anti-
trust which, at least, could be called "comprehensive." See, e. g., United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U. S. 533, 64 S. Ct. 1162, 88 L. Ed.
1440 (1944).
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however, Justices Minton and Clark and Justice Black were
in agreement in their deference toward trial court findings.
Aside from two other minor cases," 0 the 1949-50 Term
was a favorable one for the taxpayer who challenged the
broad statutory sweep that the Government usually has
claimed successfully for its tax laws. However, taxpayers
only broke even in four attempts to escape the burdens of
state-imposed taxes. One petitioner who placed his faith in
the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not prevail in his argu-
ments that a state operated bathing beach was not subject
to a federally imposed admissions tax."' Moreover, in Cap-
tot Greyhound Lines v. Brice,"2 the interstate bus carriers
received a setback when the Court in an opinion by Justice
Black, with Justices Clark and Minton joining therein, sus-
tained a nondiscriminatory two percent tax imposed by the
State of Maryland on the fair market value of motor vehicles.
The Black view that the proper interpreter of the Commerce
Clause is the Congress and not the Court was very much in
evidence." 3 The senior associate Justice commented, obiter
dicta, that, if there was to be a rule prohibiting taxes meas-
ured by vehicle value as violation of the Commerce Clause,
it should be enunciated -by Congress, and not by the Court.
The academician, Justice Frankfurter dissented, joined as
usual by Justice Jackson." 4 To a motoring laity, familiar
with the mechanical monsters which the interstate truckers
have unleashed on the country's highways, the ruling, which
the new Justices helped to formulate, has a reasonable cast
110 One of these deserves to be noted. In Manning v. Seely Tube & Box Co.,
338 U. S. 561, 70 S. Ct. 386, 94 L. Ed. - (1950), the Court held that a taxpayer
whose validly assessed deficiency was abated by a subsequent carry-back of a net
operating loss was not relieved of the burden of paying interest when the deficiency
was not promptly paid.
111 Wilmette Park District v. Campbell, 338 U. S. 411, 70 S. Ct. 195, 94 L. Ed.
.. (1949). Justice Clark wrote the opinion in the case. Justice Minton did not
participate in the decision. This was one of the several cases in which he had already
participated when he sat as a federal circuit court judge on the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
112 339 U.S. 542, 70 S. Ct. 806, 94 L. Ed....- (1950).
I's FRANx, op. cit. supra note 45, at 60.
114 339 U. S. at 548.
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to it. However, in New Jersey Realty Title Insurance Co. v.
Division of Tax Appeals,115 a New Jersey personal property
tax on a domestic insurance company's paid-up capital, which
did not deduct United States bonds and accrued interest
thereon, was held, to violate a federal statute exempting in-
terest-bearing obligations of the United States from state and
local taxation. Justice Clark wrote the opinion, joined by the
rest of the Court who participated, save that the "States-
Righter," Justice Black, dissented. Finally, in Treichler v.
Wisconsin,116 with the same judicial line-up as in the previous
New Jersey Realty case, Justice Clark handed down an opin-
ion which declared that the Wisconsin emergency tax on in-
heritances was a tax on property rated and measured in part
by tangible property outside of the State, and was unconsti-
tutional because it attempted to achieve this extraterritorial
effect. Justice Black, as could be expected, dissented from
the Truman Court's reaffirmance of the rule of Frick v. Penn-
sylvaziia," I7 where an older and more conceptualistic minded
Court had said that a Pennsylvania tax law was invalid "in
so far as it attempts to tax the transfer of tangible personalty
having an actual situs in other States."
What, then, have the two new Justices meant in the com-
plex judicial field of taxation? It appears. that their presence
has strengthened the hand of those who probe the federal tax
laws for loopholes. While in the field of state taxation pre-
viously discredited and suppositive arguments of "federal im-
munity" and "extra-territorial taxation" were revived in two
cases to inject new hope in the cause 6f the taxpayer, but to
make more difficult the ever acute task of those who must
solve the problem of raising state revenue in an age of an
expanding national government. The prime claim of the
states for their existence, aside from appeals to a Constitu-
115 338 U. S. 665, 70 SCt. 413,94 L. Ed.....(1950).
116 338 U. S. 251, 70 S. Ct. 1, 94 L. Ed -... (1949).
117 268 U. S. 473, 45 S. Ct. 603, 69 L. Ed. 1058 (1925).
118 Id., 268 U. S. at 496.
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tional tradition, is their ability to better, govern those to whom
their responsibility is close rather than distant. If they-cannot
raise the monetary minimums necessary.to execute that duty,
Holmes' wish for social experiments in the isolated compart-
ments of the States will forever go unrealized. The damage
done to responsible state government will beheavy. How-
ever, with two :decisions the other wayl"9 it cannot be pre-
dicted that there is any general trend in, that direction as a
result of. the change in the Court's personnel.
V.
Problems of Federal-State Relationships,-
Two landmark cases, involving the politically ticklish ques-
tion as to whether the Federal Government or certain indi-
vidual states had paramount rights in, and dominion over, the
valuable underwater lands (or marginal, sea), were decided
during the last Term. In United States v. Louisiana,209 the
Court, following the square precedent set in United States v.
California,"2' held that the marginal sea, including the cov-
eted oil that it may contain, is a national aid not a state
concern. Louisiana, like California, never acquired ownership
in the marginal sea., As Justice Douglas remarked: "The
claim to our three-mile belt was first asserted by the national
government. Protection and control,. of the area are indeed
functions of national external sovereignty."'1 2 The decision
of the Court in the Louisiana case was unanimous, However,
Justice Clark, victor as Attorney General in the previous
California case, did not participate. While Justice Minton
was one of the unanimous majority, because of his dissent in
the other tideland's case, it is a reliable surmise to say he did
119 See note's 11-1 and 112-supra. One- of these, however, was actually a prob-
lem of state regulation of its highways through the tax-device, rather than a -pure
tax issue.
120 339 U.S. 699, 70S. Ct. 914, 94 L. Ed..... (1950).
121 332 U. S. 19, 67 S. Ct. 1658, 91 L. Ed. 1889 (1947).
122 339 U. S. at 704.
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so more out of considerations of stare decisis, than because
he believed in the actual result reached.
With respect to United States v. Texas,' the other tide-
lands decision, there were more troublesome objections to be
overcome before the Court could decide the case in the same
manner as it had the two previously mentioned tidelands de-
cisions. Texas had been an independent republic before its
admission to the Union, and consequently it argued that, prior
to its annexation by the United States, it had possessed both
property rights and powers of government over the lands,
minerals, and other resources underlying the marginal sea.
The Court, with Justice Douglas writing an opinion in which
Justices Black, Vinson and Burton joined, rejected Texas'
effort to distinguish its position from that of its two unsuc-
cessful sister states. The majority opinion relied on the "equal
footing clause" of the Joint Resolution which admitted Texas
to the Union.'24 This entailed a relinquishment by Texas of
some of her sovereignty, at least to the extent that the United
States thereafter exercised the same powers of "national ex-
ternal sovereignty" as it did over the tidelands of the other
states of the Union. Once again Justice Clark did not par-
ticipate. However, Justice Minton joined Justices Reed and
Frankfurter in a dissent which expressed the opinion that the
case should be tried on the merits, with an examination of
just what power and authority the terms of the Joint Reso-
lution presented to Texas. They could not accept the propo-
sition that national sovereignty arose out of the necessities of
national defense, international affairs, etc.
These decisions in favor of federal supremacy over the tide-
lands oil were hostilely received in many quarters.'25 Yet as
a conservative Washington newspaper perspicuously ob-
123 339 U.S. 707, 70S. Ct. 918,94 L. Ed. .. (1950).
124 Id., 339 U. S. at 716. The Joint Resolution was approved March 1, 184S,
5 STAT. 797 (1845).
125 See, e. g. Arthur Krock's comments in Krock, The State and Their Natural
Resources, New York Times, June 8, 1950, p. 30. col. 5.
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served: "When the needs for orderly conservation of oil
resources becomes more visible than they are now, the wisdom
of the decisions may become more generally accepted." 12
What is puzzling to this writer is the failure of the Govern-
ment to argue, especially with reference to the Texas case,
that, since Texas had rebelled against the United States, when
it was accepted back into the Union after its unconditional
surrender, it retained only those rights restored to it by the
victorious United States, one of which did not include owner-
ship of the tidelands. Whatever the logical arguments on
either side of this controversy, the new Justices, with one of
them not participating, did not join completely in the Court's
two decisions which have the effect of putting under national
control an asset of tremendous potential value to the'national
defense, albeit depriving some states of a potentially rich
source of revenue.I27
However, all was not too gloomy for the states and their
cherished powers at the 1949-50 Term of Court. For in-
stance, the Supreme Court in one of -the few five to four
opinions handed down during the last Term, upheld the
authority of Virginia to issue a cease and desist order to en-
force, at least, the requirement that a foreign insurance com-
pany doing business through the mails in Virginia,*must con-
sent to suit in Virginia by service of process on the Secretary
of State.128 Any other result might have forced a complain-
ing Virginia citizen to sue the insurance company -in its home
state, Nebraska. While Justice Clark joined in this functional
view of the state power, as expressed in Justice Black's ma-
jority opinion, the other Court freshman, Justice Minton,
126 Washington Evening Star, June 7,1950, p. 12M.
127 The Government's legal victories have not meant as yet, that the interim
leases granted by the states to private operators, under federal supervision, are
terminated. In fact, there is good reason to suspect that legislation authorizing
continued state operation of the off-shore lands will soon be passed. Washington
Post, August 20, 1950, p. 10M. Mr. Ickes is absolutely sure that this will be the
case. Ickes, Need Justice Be Deaf and Dumb, 123 New Republic, Oct. 2, 1950, p. 17.
128 Travelers Health Ass'n. et a]. v. Virginia ex ref. State Corp. Commission,
339 U. S. 643, 70 S. Ct. 927, 94 L. Ed..... (1950).
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wrote the dissent.1 29 It was one of the few times during the
Term that the two new Justices disagreed in a case. Truth-
fully, Justice Minton's dissent was mainly a rehash of the
quasi-metaphysics of the much labored and much misunder-
stood doctrine of in personam service. He does not regard
doing business by mail as sufficient to warrant the imposition
of constructive personal service. In the face of present day
business realities, with special reference to the mail order
houses, Justice Minton's dissent is departure from the prac-
tical approach to the problems of regulation which he usually
manifests.
Again, in United States v. Burnison, ° with only Justice
Black registering a dissent, the Court sustained a California
probate statute which prevented a California domiciliary
from making an unrestricted testamentary gift to the United
States, although such a gift may be made to California, its
counties and municipal corporations. The two new Justices
joined Justice Reed in his majority opinion which found
nothing in the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution to pro-
hibit a state from preventing its domiciliaries from willing
property to the Federal Government. Thus the Court per-
mitted a small measure of comfort to the states in their never
ending efforts to raise and preserve needed funds. Compared
to the limitations which other decisions, previously men-
tioned, imposed on the realization of state hopes along these
lines, it was not much about which the states could rejoice.
Moreover, federal supremacy received a more favorable
reception in Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama, 1 where
the two new appointees joined a majority opinion by Justice
Black, to rule that state pleading and practice requirements
cannot override federal substantive rights. A state court de-
cision sustaining a general demurrer to a complaint claiming
damages under the Federal Employer's Liability Act was re-
129 Id, 339 i. S. at 655.
130 339 U. S.87,70S. Ct. 503,94 L. Ed-....(1950).
131 338 U. S. 294, 70 S. Ct. 105, 94 L. Ed. (1949),
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versed by the Supreme Court,.- The :Court made it clear that
the state- court's construction of the7 complaint to the effect
that it did not state -a cause of action for negligence under
the federal statute, was not binding on -the Supreme Court,
which will determine for itself. whether a federal rightgranted
by Congress -to injured workmen-, has been,-alleged pro-
perly.
The cases just summarizedlon the federal-tate relation-
ship furnish Some" interesting clues to the judicial lphilosophy
of President Truman's latest two :appointees., In those cases
where a state's power to tax 'was questioned, -Justices Clark
and Minton usually had displayed stronger sympathy for the
faxpayer, rather thafn: the'state. However, "states-rights"
was n ot entirely neglected by them. The- tidelands oil deci-
sions found Justice Minton partially hostile to- the federal
claims which prevailed therein. The Travelers Health Ass'n
decision shows that Justice- Clark, at least,'is willing to tol-
erate broad, but seeming'lynecessary, state powers of regula-
tion over out-of-state - corporations- doing business there.
However, the humane bias-which the two new Justices usual-
ly manifest in favor of the claims. of labor or the workingman
overrode consideration of a state's control over its rules of
pleading.' Where broad federal ,social legislation is concerned,
the two High Court initiates seem predisposed, to subserve
other questions of practice,, pleading, comity, etc., to a, sens-




This article has already iattempted-to point6ut-the--sym-
pathies that the two newest Supreme Court Justices appar-
ently harbor towardlabor.1 32 The, cases- decided during: the
1949-50 Term which involved questions of labor relations
132 See text supra, Part II.
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seem to support, in part, that observation. For instance, while
Justice Clark did not participate, Justice Minton joined a ma-
jority of the Court in the important holding that the Fair
Labor Standards Act and the Walsh-Healy Act are not mu-
tually exclusive, but supplementary.'33 Thus, the employees
of an independent contractor who was operating a govern-
ment owned munitions plant, were to be considered employees
of the contractor and not the United States, and hence en-
titled to the benefits of the Fair Labor Standards Act.3 The
Walsh-Healy Act,'35 the statute passed two years before the
Fair Labor Standards Act, protects only employees working
on materials to be sold to the government. Its remedial pro-
cedures are more cumbersome and less advantageous to the
employee, than those provided by the Fair Labor Standards
Act which applies over the broad field of interstate commerce,
so far as Congress has exercised its power thereover by that
Act. At any rate, the Court makes it clear that some em-
ployees may be in the comfortable position of enjoying the
complementary protection afforded by both these statutes.
Again, in Railway Labor Executive's Ass'n v. United
States,'86 the Court, with both Justices Minton and Clark
agreeing, handed down an opinion which went far to protect
railroad employees whose employment would be affected by
a railroad consolidation. Justice Burton's majority opinion
held that the Interstate Commerce Commission had the
power to require a fair and equitable arrangement to protect
the compensatory interests of the railroad employees beyond
the four years which the Interstate Commerce Act ... spe-
cifically allowed. The Court, ignoring the plain words of the
statute and respectfully rejecting the administrative interpre-
L33 Powell et al. v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U. S. 497, 70 S. Ct. 755,
94 L. Ed..... (1950).
134 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U. S. C. §§ 201 et seq. (1946), 63
STAT. 910 (1949), 29 U. S. C. §§ 201 et seq. (Supp. 1950).
135 49 STAT. 2036 (1936), as amended, 56 STAT. 277 (1942), 41 U. S. C. § 35
(1946).
136 339 U. S. 142, 70S. Ct. 530, 94 L. Ed.....(1950).
137 54 STAT. 906-7 (1940), 49 U. S. C. § 5(2) (f) (1946).
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tation of the ICC, held that the four year protection afforded
by the statute was merely a minimum and not a maximum
period of protection. Those who are familiar with the in-
terminable length of corporate reorganizations will appreci-
ate the realism, as well as the humanitarianism, of the Court's
decision.
Coming now to cases involving the more controversial ques-
tions of labor relations, we see that the favor with which the
two new Justices usually regard labor's claims is not so much
in evidence. In the now well known American Communica-
tions Ass'n, C. I. 0. v. Douds case,13 the Court sustained
Section 9 (h) (Non-Communist affidavit provision) of the
Taft-Hartley Act 131 against objections that it was a denial of
free speech, an ex post facto law, a bill of attainder, uncon-
stitutionally vague, and violative of the non-religious oath
provision of the Constitution. Chief Justice Vinson's majority
opinion emphasized that 9(h) was a regulation of conduct
bearing a reasonable relation to the evil which it was designed
to reach. He rejected axiomatic application of the "clear and
present danger" test without consideration of all the circum-
stances presented by the particular situation in which it is
asserted. The prevention of political strikes, called by Com-
munist union leaders, is a legitimate Congressional objective,
and is properly directed at a serious substantive evil, said the
Court. The two new Justices disqualified themselves. Justice
Black dissented in a ringing exposition of the principles of free
thought as symbolized by the First Amendment.' Justice
Jackson, joined by Justice Frankfurter, handed down a bril-
liant opinion.' In it he concurred in that part of the Court's
decision which upheld the parts of the Taft-Hartley oath pro-
visions which required disclosure of overt acts of affiliation
or membership in the Communist party, but dissented from
138 339 U.S. 382, 70 S. Ct. 674,94 L. Ed.....(1950).
138 61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 159(h) (Supp. 1950).
140 339 U. S. at 445.
141 Id., 339 U. S. at 422.
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sustaining that part of the oath requirement which-called for
a disclosure of belief in a totalitarian organization, uncon-
nected with any overt act. His opinion contained what is,
perhaps, the most lucid judicial analysis of the nature of the
Communist party yet made.
14
There the situation stood until a second decision involving
the controversial oath provision, Osman v. Douds.4 3 Justice
Minton, following the view he had taken as a circuit court
judge, joined Justices Vinson, Reed and Burton to sustain
the oath in toto, in this second "oath" case, while Justices
Black, Jackson, Frankfurter, and Justice Douglas, who was
absent at the time of the American Communications Associa-
tion case, dissented, on the grounds that the belief parts of
the oath were unconstitutional.' 44 Justice Clark abstained,.
and until he indicates his views on this controversial question
of oath, the matter cannot be said to have been settled with
finality, at least insofar as the provisions require disclosure
of political belief. Perhaps we may find some clue to his posi-
tion if he participates in the decision on the appeal of the
Communist leaders convicted under the Smith Act.' 45
The difficult assignment which the Court had of deciding
the permissible regulatory powers of the states over picketing
brought forth some surprising reactions on the part of Justice
Minton. The cases involving picketing problems demonstrate
that the Court continues to entertain a view of picketing
similar to that popularized by Professor Gregory, 4 6 that is,
picketing is more than the pure dissemination of information.
It is rather a' type of coercion, depending for its persuasive-
142 It was widely popularized, appearing in Harpers Magazine, September,
1950, p. 21.
143 339 U. S. 846, 70 S. Ct. 901, 94 L. Ed....(1950).,
144 Id., 339 U. S. at 847. Actually, Justice Black dissented en toto onthe same
grounds as he took in -his dissent in'the American communications Ass'n.'case. How-
ever, he joined justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Douglas who dissented on the
portion of the oath dealing with beliefs. Justice Douglas felt that, the membership
and beliefs sections of the oath were not severable and must both fall since he had
come to the conclusion that the belief section was unconstitutional.
145 United States v. Dennis et al., 183 F. (2d) 201 (2d Cir. 1950).
146 GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 345-8 (1946).
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ness not so much on the justice of the cause in which it is
used, but rather on the psychological embargo that it exerts
around the picketed employer.147 For instance, at the 1948-49
Term, in the Giboney v. Emp-re Storage & Ice Co. case,'
the Supreme Court had sustained a state court decree enjoin-
ing peaceful picketing carried on for the acknowledged pur-
pose of coercing the employer to violate a state antitrust law.
This decision clearly presaged what happened at the 1949-50
Term. In one decision the Supreme Court sustained a Wash-
ington state court injunction restraining peaceful picketing
which had been carried on :to coerce an employer to compel
his employees to join the union.'49 Justice Minton wrote the
majority opinion, emphasizing that the public policy of the
state insisted that workers shall be free. to join or not join
a union without any employer coercion., An injunction which
helps preserve that policy does not violate "free speech" con-
cepts when applied even to peaceful picketing.'50 Justice
Clark joined in the unanimous opinion.
However, in another decision on picketing, Justice Minton
took a different tack- from the position he had assumed in
the preceding case., The majority of the Court, including
Justice Clark, held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
bar a state court injunction prohibiting picketing which had
as its objective the compelling of an owner-controlled and
operated business to grant a union shop. 5 ' However, Justice
Minton had other ideas, and in his dissent, while asserting
his awareness that "picketing is more than speech," he dis-
agrees with the state court's, attempt to enjoin all peaceful
picketing, rather than directing itself at any specific abuses
147 GREGORY AND KATZ, LABOR LAW-CASES, MATERALS AND COMsENTS 309
(1948)
-148 336U. S.490, 69S. Ct. 684,-93-L. Ed. 834 (1949).
149 ,Building Service Employees International Union v. Gazzam, 339 U. S. 532,
70 S. Ct. 784, 94 L. Ed. -- (1950).
150 Ibid.
151 International Brotherhood, etc. v. Hanke et al., 339 U. S. 470, 70 S. Ct.
773,94 L. Ed..... (1950).
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thereof. 5 ' Moreover, we perceive once again Justice Min-
ton's particular reverence for stare decisis as he reminds his
colleagues that the doctrine of peaceful picketing as free
speech has its roots deep in several important precedents,
from which, he felt, the Court was departing in the instant
case.' 53 Justice Minton then departs from the judicial defer-
ence which he had exhibited in the Washington case toward
the judgment of a state in striking the proper balance between
peaceful, constitutionally protected picketing, and the per-
missible limits of contest open to industrial combatants. Per-
haps the stare decisis factor is the key to the difference in
approach. More likely, however, Justice Minton regards
peaceful picketing to compel violations of a state prescribed
labor policy as different in nature from that used to secure
a well known and legitimate goal of trade unions, i.e., the
union shop.
In the related field of state labor laws, the Truman Court
was faced with the problem of determining how far Congress
has occupied the labor relations field. In the International
Union, etc. v. O'Brien case,'54 the Court unanimously agreed
that Congress has closed the field to the extent that there is
attempted concurrent state regulation of peaceful strikes for
higher wages. Therefore, Michigan's Bonine-Tripp Act,'55
which prohibited strikes unless and until a majority of the
employees had voted to strike in an election conducted by the
state, conflicted with superior federal regulation on the same
subject. The result here may be regarded as a limitation on
decisions of previous terms which had permitted rather ex-
tensive state regulation in the area of labor relations.15
Finally, the Truman Court made it clear that administra-
tive "expertise" in the difficult labor relations field was not
152 Id., 339 U. S. at 481.
153 Ibid.
154 339 U. S. 454, 70 S. Ct. 781, 94 L. Ed...-. (1950).
155 MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.454(1) et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1949).
156 See, e. g., International Union, U. A. W. A., A. F. of L. v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Board et al., 336 U. S. 245, 69 S. Ct. 516, 93 L. Ed. 651 (1949).
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to be slighted or ignored by the Courts. Thus, in Slocum v.
Delaware, L. & W. Ry.,15' the Court ruled that the National
Railway Adjustment Board had exclusive jurisdiction to ad-
just grievances and disputes arising out of collective bargain-
ing agreements. Similarly, the Court held that a state court
has no jurisdiction of a declaratory judgment suit instituted
by a railroad in search of a ruling on the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement concerning conductor's extra pay for
certain types of services., Justices Clark and Minton were
with the majority of the Court in both of these decisions.
Moreover, they gave further evidence that they would not
acquiesce in any attempts to circumvent judicially the use of
the administrative powers in the complex field of labor rela-
tions when, with Justice Clark writing the majority opinion,
they helped fashion a polite admonition to the Federal Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in NLRB v. Mexia
Textile Mills."9 The Court in this case overruled the fifth.
circuit court, and held that compliance by an employer with
a cease and desist order of the NLRB does not render the case
moot, since the Board is entitled to have any possible resump-
tion of the unfair practice barred by the enforcement decree
of the reviewing court. In his majority opinion Justice Clark
manifests a respectful appreciation of the proper scope of
administrative responsibility in a field where it is particularly
necessary that it be brought to bear without being subverted,
either by premature appeals to the judiciary, or by restrictive
judicial restraints which are imposed, not for the protection
of individual litigants, but only to make more difficult effec-
tive administrative actions in pursuance of statutorily im-
posed duties.
Scanning the record of the new Justices in labor decisions
at their first term, we merely can repeat what has been men-
157 339 U. S. 239, 70 S. Ct. 577, 94 L. Ed.....(1950).
158 Order of Railway Conductors v. Southern Ry., 339 U. S. 255, 70 S. Ct. 585,
94 L. Ed .... (1950).
59 339 U.S. 563, 70S. Ct. 826,94 L. Ed..... (1950).
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tioned previously. Generally they are sympathetic to the
claims of labor, especially if the question is one of the scope
of a remedial piece of social legislation. Yet Justice Minton,
at least, with Justice Clark's position not yet having been
adequately indicated, is willing to allow the federal powers
over commerce to be used in attempt to forestall political
strikes by requiring an oath of orthodoxy from union leaders.
Since the great national unions already had purged themselves
of Communists who formerly had infiltrated their ranks, pre-
sumably Justice Minton's position is not inconsistent with
his usual attitude in other types of labor cases. The problem
of picketing found the two new colleagues in their first major
disagreement, with Justice Minton willing to go much further
in tolerating peaceful picketing. Both, however, joined in
opinions which set limits to any process by which the states
might appropate to themselves authority in the areas of
labor relations where federal uniformity is an essential, if
a national problem is to receive a uniform solution. Finally,-
the two new Justices, with Justice Clark sparking the effort,
curbed several efforts to reduce the sweep and effectiveness
of the administrative process in favor of a return to an out-
moded judicial handling of labor disputes.
VII.
Criminal Law and Procedure
In this field of law, where strong claims that fundamental
constitutional guarantees have been ignored by law enforce-
ment officers are raised frequently by vicious felons, the
mettle of the Court often has been severely tested. It was
no different at the 1949-50 Term of Court. The cases pro-
duced one grave overruling of what had been considered to
be a notable precedent, and in doing so the two new Justices
laid themselves 6pen to the charge that with a change in the
personnel of the Court, there had come a change of law. In
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United States v. Rabinowitz,'60 , Justice Minton wrote a ma-
jority opinion which overruled Trupiano v. United States' '
to the extent that the latterdecision rdquired that the neces -
sity for procuring a search warrant be judged on the basis of
practicability; rather than upon'the reasonableness of' the
search following a lawful arrest. Justice Clark also joined in
this majority opinion, which held that a general search with-
out a search warrant of an -accused's one-room: office follow-
ing his lawful arrest therein on a charge of selling illegal
postage stamps, Wa§ a lawful one, incidental to the arrest,
even though the arresting officers'knew the accused possessed
the stamps and could'have secured a search "warrant in ad-
vance. A strong dissenting opinion, written by Justice Frank-
furter1'62 aid concurred in by Justice Jackison and, in an un-
usual reversal of form on this question, by justice Black,
1 6 3
scored What was labeled as a departure from the Fourth
Amendment aid the doctrine of stare decisis. In the course
of' his stricture to the majority Justice Frankfurter re-
nirked: 64  .
Especially ought the Court not reenforce needlessly the in-
stabilities of our 'day by gMng fair ground for the belief that
Law is the expression of chance-for instance, of unexpected
changes in the Court's composition and the- contingencies in
the choice of successors.
While these are remarkable words coming from a judge
who has pioneered more than one of the Roosevelt Court's
160 - 339 U. S. 56, 70 S: ct. 430, 94 L. Ed.... (190).
-161 334 U.S. 699,;68 S. Ct. 1229,92 L. Ed.1663 (1948).. . ..
162 339 U. S. at 66.
163 TUstice Black usually demonstrates a tendency 'to support broad "search
and seizure" authority. 'See, e. g., Harris v. United' St ates, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S. Ct.
1098, 91 L. Ed. 1399 '(1947). - As a matter of fact, Justice Bladc had dissented in
the Trupiano decision. In "the Rabinowitz dissent, however,- he indicates that the
rule of the Trupiano case should not be discarded so soon, until, at least, it had been
given a fair test. Moreover, he manifests a sympathy for the Constitutional values
on which -Justice Fiankfurter relies in -his dissent. Perhaps Justice Black really is
quite embarrassed that the new faces on the Court have placed in a majority posi-
tion a concept of "search and seizure" in which, though he had previously supported
it, he did not believe very enthusiastically.
164 339 U. S. at 66.
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departures from the avenues of precedent," 5 nevertheless,
it seems fair to observe that, had Justices Murphy and Rut-
ledge lived, the result undoubtedly would have been the other
way in the Rabinowitz case.166 If so, it seems the possibilities
of abuse by conviction-happy police officers would have been
lessened rather than, as was the case, increased.
However, in another case dealing with the "search and
seizure" problem, the new Justices were found this time on
the side of a petitioner who claimed that Constitutional rights
under the Fourth Amendment were being impaired. In Dis-
triet of Columbia v. Little 16 the Court held that the refusal
of a respondent to open the door for an inspection by a Dis-
trict of Columbia health inspector, who did not have a war-
rant, was not a violation of an ordinance prohibiting "unlaw-
ful interference" with the duties of inspectors. Justice Min-
ton wrote the majority opinion and in doing so avoided de-
cision on the constitutional question presented. The Dis-
trict of Columbia had raised the point by arguing that the
Fourth Amendment has no application whatever to admin-
istrative health inspections.
The habeas corpus merry-go-round returned to plague the
Court at the 1949-50 Term. In Darr v. Burford, 6 ' a major-
ity of the Court, including the two new judges, held that
a federal district court had properly denied habeas corpus
to a petitioner who had failed to take a petition of certiorari
to the Supreme Court following a denial of his original habeas
corpus petition by the highest court of a state. Respect for
165 Justice Frankfurter, speaking in Helvering v. Hollock, 309 U. S. 106, 60 S.
Ct. 444, 84 L. Ed. 604 (1940), one of the reversals of precedent in the tax field
which aroused the blood pressure of the tax bar, said: "But stare decisis is a prin-
ciple of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision,
however, recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a
prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by
experience."
166 That the pendulum is swinging in the direction of a more restricted "search
and seizure" protection, see Fraenkel, Searches and Skulduggery, 171 THE NAIION
32 (1950).
167 339 U.S. 1, 70S. Ct. 468,94 L. Ed..... (1950).
168 339 U.S. 200, 70S. Ct. 587,94 L. Ed.....(1950).
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the major responsibilities which the states have for the main-
tenance of law and order within their own borders, and "the
dignity and importance of their role as guardians of the ad-
ministration of criminal justice" demand that the Supreme
Court be given an opportunity to review their acts before re-
sort may be had to the federal courts. However, Justice Clark
in his concurring opinion took pains to emphasize that a de-
nial of certiorari following a state high court disallowance of
habeas corpus has no necessary reference to the merits of the
claim. 69 This point was developed further in Jusice Frank-
furter's dissent ... wherein, joined 'by Justices Jackson and
Black, he argues persuasively that the power of federal dis-
trict courts to issue a writ of habeas corpus should not be
barred simply because a petition for certiorari was not first
made to the Supreme Court. It would appear that the two
new Justices and the rest of majority have ignored two con-
siderations: one, a rule of judicial procedure, the other, the
psychological realities of the actual situation. First, it is
well settled that "a denial of certiorari has no legal signifi-
cance"; and, secondly, federal district courts will not feel
favorably disposed to habeas corpus petitions to which the
Supreme Court has already indicated that it is indifferent,
if not opposed, by denying certiorari. As a matter of fact,
a lower federal court has already taken the view that the
denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court precludes a later
grant of habeas corpus.' This court merely seems to out-
spokenly express a view that every federal court will embrace,
consciously or unconsciously. If so, the Truman Court has
helped to restrict an ancient and honorable writ out of hyper-
solicitude for state court "dignity."
Habeas corpus received another, but more justifiable cur-
tailment, in Johnson v. Eisentrager.'2 There the new Jus-
169 Id., 339 U. S. at 219.
170 lbfid.
171 Goodwin v. Smyth, 181 F. (2d) 498 (4th Cir. 1950).
172 339 U. S. 763, 70 S. Ct. 936, 94 L. Ed.. -(1950).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
tices joined a six judge majority which held that federal courts
have no jurisdiction to grant habeas corpus to German mili-
tary aliens who were captured and convicted in China by an
American Military Commission for their military activities
against the United States after the surrender of the Reich
but before the capitulation of Japan. While Justice Black,
along with Justices Douglas and Burton, protested earnestly
against the majority's alleged failure to remember that "con-
quest by the United States, unlike others, does not mean
tyranny," "I it seems that the decision has the merit of "re-
stricting the scope of American law to the areas where it can
reasonably be enforced." "I At any rate practical considera-
tions may justify the Court's restriction of habeas corpus in
this instance, whereas, in Darr v. Bur ford, their persuasive-
ness seems rather feeble when examined in the light of what
actually may have been done.
Several important decisions dealing with jury composition
questions also high-lighted the criminal law side of the 1949-
50 calendar. Two of them dealt 'with the question of whether
federal government employees are disqualified from serving
on a jury in a criminal case to which the Government is
a party solely by reason of their government employment. In
Dennis v. United States,1 ' with Justices Clark and Douglas
not participating, Justice Minton wrote the majority opinion
which gave a negative answer to that question, by holding
that government employees were not barred from serving on
a jury trying a well known Communist for contempt of Con-
gress. Justice Minton deprecated the defense's argument that
government employees, fearful that the slightest taint of Bol-
shevism might be applied to them, hardly could bring dis-
passionate objectivity to bear in deciding the case. Justices
Frankfurter and Black,... continuing the surprising number
173 Id., 339 U. S. at 791.
174 Editorial, Washington Post, July 14, 1950, p. 12.
175 339 U. S. 162, 70 S. Ct. 519, 94 L. Ed .... (1950).
176 Id., 339 U. S. at 175.
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of occasions at the last Term when these two judicial oppo-
sites were found together in vigorous dissent, took powerful
issue with the assumptions of Jusice Minton that only "vague
conjecture" supported the argument that Government em-
ployees might be intimidated in their judgment in a case in-
volving the United States of America versus a known or
strongly suspected Communist. However, in Morford v.
United States,"' a companion case to the Dennis appeal,
Justice Minton presumably agreed with a per curiam opinion
which reversed the conviction for contempt where defense
counsel had not been permitted to ask questions seeking to
prove actual bias on the part of Government employees who
served on the jury.
The final jury problem was posed by Cassell v. Texas
where a majority of the Court agreed that there was unequal
protection of the laws in the grand jury selection practices
of county jury commissioners who admitted "that they chose
only whom they knew and that they knew no Negroes." The
case involved the reversal of a murder conviction by a Negro
who had been indicted by a jury subject to selection in the
manner just described. Justice Minton concurred, not be-
cause reversal in his eyes was justified by the jury commis-
sioners' admissions, but because of the practice of the com-
missioners in compiling jury lists which never contained more
than one Negro.' 9 Justice Clark also concurred and, after
some questioning of the policy of reversing convictions of
those obviously guilty solely because of discrimination in the
selecting of a grand jury, goes along out of what, perhaps,
can be discerned as more a respect for stare decisis than any
firm conviction in the righteousness of the decision."'
There were other interesting miscellaneous decisions in the
field of criminal law and procedure, including a holding, in
177 339 U. S. 258, 70 S. Ct. 586, 94 L. Ed..... (1950).
178 339 U. S. 282, 70 S. Ct. 629, 94 L. Ed..... (1950).
179 Id., 339 U. S. at 290.
180 Id., 339 U. S. at 296.
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which both the new Justices joined, that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require that an adversary hearing be
given after sentence to a convicted murderer on the question
of his sanity, where the proof of his sanity had been supported
by the report of three physicians.' Justice Frankfurter dis-
sented by the strained, syllogistic reasoning that, since due
process forbids a state to execute an insane man, ergo, a peti-
tioner is entitled to an adversarial trial of that issue.1
8 2
However, Justice Frankfurter was more fortunate in per-
suading the two new appointees to join his judicial camp on
another and more important issue. One of the great divisions
on the Court over the recent years has been over the question
of whether the Bill of Rights is embraced in the Fourteenth
Amendment, or whether the latter merely embodies "funda-
mental principles of natural justice." Justice Black, formerly
supported by Justice Douglas, and the late Justices Murphy
and Rutledge, has argued vigorously, and with great efforts
at historical documentation,'83 for the former view, while
Justice Frankfurter has headed a majority view of the matter
which adheres to the "natural justice" case-by-case approach.
In the field of criminal procedure the argument is not a ster-
ile, philosophical one, but bears a direct relationship to a final
determination of whether men live or die, go to prison or go
free. In Quicksall v. Michigan,'84 the Court decided that the
fact a prisoner was not offered counsel after being charged
with murder did not amount to a denial of a due process,
where the record shows he had pleaded guilty and failed to
complain of a lack of counsel. Justice Frankfurter wrote the
majority opinion in which Justices Clark and Minton joined.
Justice Black, with Justice Douglas not participating, and
Justices Murphy and Rutledge gone, was the single dissenter,
apparently still supporting the view that what would be a vio-
181 Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U. S. 9, 70 S. Ct. 457, 94 L. Ed ... (1950).
182 Id., 339 U. S. at 14.
183 Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 67 S. Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903 (1947).
184 339 U. S. 660, 70S. Ct. 910, 94 L. Ed.....(1950).
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lation of the Sixth Amendment in the federal sphere, likewise
should be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment when
committed by state action.'85 The advent of Justices Clark
and Minton seems to have foreclosed any immediate hopes
that the minority view of the Adamson v. California case"8 6
would become a majority.
We may say that the one area of Supreme Court action
in which the opinions of the new Justices have caused a defin-
ite shift in the course of decisions is that of criminal law and
procedu e. Move tolerant than their predecessors of the
sweep of the search and seizure powers, less imbued than they
with a reverence for habeas corpus, and not convinced of
Justice Black's concept of inter-relationship of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Bill of Rights, they may have contrib-
uted to what one commentator has referred to as "a danger-




It was in the broad field of civil liberties that the Truman
Court both scored its greatest decisional triumphs of the term,
and, on the other hand, handed down an opinion which may
serve as an evil precedent by which all of their good work
could be severely curtailed, if not actually undone. In three
monumental cases the Court stripped away the cruel consti-
tutional facade called "separate but equal." In McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents 188 the Court refused to sanction
even a symbolic segregation. In a unanimous opinion the Tru-
man Court held that Oklahoma could not segregate Negro
students from white students even though it was merely an
absurd, "nominal" segregation, consisting of special sections
185 Id., 339 U. S. at 666.
186 See note 183 supra.
187 Fraenkel, supra note 166 at 35.
188 339 U.S. 637, 70S. Ct. 851,94 L. Ed.....(1950).
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for Negro students in the classrooms, cafeteria, and library.
With even "nominal" segregation in public education perhaps
now outlawed,189 it seems that Justice Harlan will soon be vin-
dicated, and the vicious "separate but equal" doctrine given a
well deserved repose. This prophesy is supported by illumi-
nating remarks which the Court made in a second precedental
education-segregation case. In Sweatt v. Painter 190 the
Court told Texas that its establishment of a separate law
school for Negroes did not comply with the "equal protection
of the laws" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and, there-
fore, the state must admit a Negro, qualified in all other re-
spects, to its "white" law school. In reaching that conclu-
sion the Court, after comparing the tangible and intangible
values of the two law schools, closed its opinion with this real-
istic appraisal: "It is difficult to believe that one who had a
free choice between these law schools would consider the
question close." '10 With those words, "separate but equal"
at last should have been denuded of any applicability it may
have had, even as a shibboleth, in the field of public higher
education.' 92 An early decision of the 1950-51 Term con-
cerning the question of segregation on a public golf course,
supports the assumption that the Court meant what it said
in the education-segregation cases.'93
189 The terms in which the Court has overruled segregation in the instant case
makes its ultimate and complete rejection in all areas more likely to occur, Jim
Crow in Handcuffs, 122 New Republic, June 19, 1950, p. 5.
190 339 U. S. 629, 70 S. Ct. 848, 94 L. Ed. .... (1950).
191 Id., 339 U. S. at 634.
192 Indeed, the tide is running strong against segregation in education, at least
at the college level. The following Southern states, at the time this article was writ-
ten, -have either admitted qualified Negro students to their higher educational facili-
ties, are taking steps to admit, or legal action is pending to require them to do so:
Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, and Virginia. These successes have not been achieved without much litiga-
tion, but litigation, along with legislation and education, is equally an instrument of
democratic advance which must be used when propitious in order to secure the
equality under law of which we boast. Rose, The Art of Compromise, The Pro-
gressive, August, 1950, p. 11.
193 Rice v. Arnold, 340 U. S ..... , 71 S. Ct. 77, 94 L. Ed .... (1950). In its
brief order in the golf-course case, the Supreme Court sent the case back for action
"in light of" its racial segregation decisions of previous term. Case is found below
at .... Fla ..... 45 So. (2d) 195 (1950).
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The pattern of the Court's thinking, as revealed in the edu-
cation cases was reflected further in the Henderson v. United
States case,194 where a unanimous Court overturned the seg-
gregation imposed in the dining cars on railroads moving in
interstate commerce. While the decision Was based on the
anti-discrimination provision of the Interstate Commerce Act,
it is another marking on a barometer which indicates that the
constitutional sophistries that once we relied on to inflict
second-class citizenship are fast losing any force they may
have once had." 5
In all of these splendid judicial achievements, the two new
Justices went along with the unanimous majority although
Justice Clark did not take part in the Henderson case. Their
participation in the already tremendous catharsis of racial
prejudice in education and transportation which these cases
have caused "I must be complimented. However, their rec-
ord on civil rights has other, more depressing aspects. For
instance, there was a disturbing blight on the record which
the new Court had achieved in giving real meaning to equal
protection of the laws. In the Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town
Corp. case, 97 the Supreme Court refused to review a decision
of the New York Court of Appeals which had upheld the
Negro ban that the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
applied in its ninety-three million dollar publicly subsidized
housing project, Stuyvesant Town. The constitutional issue
in the case appeared clear cut enough: may a private com-
pany exclude a racial group from a housing project which the
company has erected with the help of eminent domain, tax
194 Henderson v. United States, 339 U. S. 816, 70 S. Ct., 843, 94 L. Ed.
(1950).
195 The ICC recently ordered the Southern Railroad to end all racial segrega-
tion on dining cars running across state lines. Washington Post, November 11, 1950,
p. 15B.
196 A confidence has been expressed in some circles that exclusion of Negroes
from higher educational institutions will soon be at an end due to recent opinions of
the Court. Washington Evening Star, Oct. 18, 1950. p. A-4. Official New York
State studies confirm this hope. New York Times, Sept. 25, 1950, p. 25, col. 8.
197 299 N. Y. 512, 87 N. E. (2d) 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 981, 70 S.
Ct. 243, 94 L. Ed. .__ (1950).
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concessions, and other special governmental aid and super-
vision? In avoiding a direct decision on this point, the new
Court, unwittingly or not, has given a shot in the arm to those
who would foster patterns of racial segregation in the federal
urban redevelopment program. 98 What the Court has pro-
hibited the states to do in the area of education seems to have
been sanctioned indirectly as proper in the great semi-public
housing programs over the nation. Stuyvesant Town Corp. is
a decision that brings no credit to the Court, especially in view
of their other magnificent anti-segregation decisions.
In South v. Peters,'99 the two new Justices joined a per
curiam majority opinion which refused to rule on the con-
stitutionality of Georgia's uniquely discriminatory county
unit rule method of counting votes in the primaries." 0 Under
this system, each county is assigned from two to six votes,
according to population. The candidate who gets the most
votes in a given county gets that county's whole unit vote.
Since a populous county like Fulton, with a five hundred
thousand population, is weighted equally with a rural county
of forty-five thousand population, the disproportionate in-
fluence of the anti-Negro rural votes is self evident. The
majority used the familiar dodge of "political question" to
evade their duty of rectifying this method of scaling down
the weight of individual votes in the city areas. As the dis-
sent pointed out, this "last loophole" around previous clear-
cut, courageous civil rights decisions of the Court well may
provide an effective technique to achieve in fact discrimina-
tion in the right of suffrage among voters of Southern states,
where anti-Negro feeling still runs high. If so, it is the black-
198 For a critical view of the Court's decision in the Stuyvesant case, see Abrams
Slum Clearance Boomerangs, 171 THE NATION 106 (1950). There is some evidence
that the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. after its success in the case, attempted to
evict tenants who had played a part in appealing the case to the courts. New York
Times, Sept. 25, 1950, p. 25, col. 6.
199 339 U. S. 276, 70 S. Ct. 641, 94 L. Ed..... (1950).
200 The county-unit system -has enabled the Talmadges, Sr. and Jr. to be
elected to office in Georgia when their popular vote was less than a majority.
Herman Again, 123 New Republic, July 10, 1950, p. 7.
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est mark that a neutral observer may assess against the early
judicial records of Justices Clark and Minton."'
Some miscellaneous decisions in the field of civil rights
reveal further evidence that the two latest Truman appointees
sometimes display a less than, bubbling enthusiasm for the
protection of personal rights. For instance, previous refer-
ence has been made to Justice Minton's position on the con-
stitutionality of the belief provisions of "non-Communist"
oath, and also his willingness to restrict somewhat the pro-
tections of the "search and seizure" clause. In addition, Jus-
tice Minton joined in an opinion at the 1949-50 Term which
held that a lack of a quorum at the time of the return of
a subpoena is no defense to a contempt conviction for failure
to comply with the subpoena of a Congressional investigating
committee." 2 Moreover, both of the new Justices joined in
a per curiam opinion which denied certiorari to the Holly-
wood writers who were convicted of contempt for their failure
to answer questions put to them by a Congressional commit-
tee on their alleged membership in the Communist party. 03
With the current fervor for loyalty oaths of all sorts, sizes
and descriptions, 04 the contribution which Justices Clark and
Minton have made in steering the Court to an attitude of
indifference to the delicate demarcation of the sphere in which
legitimate political beliefs are to be protected from legisla-
tive and executive inquisition, looms as an important element
in evaluating constitutional trends in the field of political
liberty.
Thus the record of the two Justices runs hot and cold in
that broad field labeled "civil liberties." Accepting the
201 Of course, the disproportionate representation which is afforded the rural
counties in most states is a broader problem than the county-unit system alone. It
really is "government by the minority" in a rather blatant way. Neuberger,
Farmers in the Saddle, 123 New Republic, Oct. 2, 1950, p. 13. A recent grievous
example was the Maryland Democratic primary where the gubernatorial candidate
who received a majority of twenty thousand in the popular vote, nevertheless lost
the primary by 16 unit votes. Washington Post, Sept. 30, 1950, p. 7.
202 United States v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323, 70 S. Ct. 724, 94 L. Ed _... (1950).
203 Trumbo v. United States, 339 U. S. 934, 70 S. Ct. 663, 94 L. Ed..... (1950).
204 For a case study, see STEWART, THE YEAR or THE OATH (1950).
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Court's realistic approach to the application of "equal pro-
tection of the laws" clause of the Constitution to public edu-
cation, they evidently are not ready to apply the same real-
ism in the field of semi-public housing. Concerned lest a Negro
be denied a meal on an interstate train, they turn their backs
when it is a question of watering down his vote. Coupled
with the evidence of their apparent acquiescence in the "oath-
taking" rage of the moment, it becomes fairly evident that
the Truman Court, like the Roosevelt Court, and all the
Courts that have gone before it, "follows the election re-
turns." The crucial test would be put if and when the elec-
tion returns place fundamental constitutional guarantees in
danger. It may be premature, but one gets the feeling that
the two new appointees have an inclination to ride with pub-
lic opinion no matter where it may lead.
Ix.
Administrative Law, Statutory Construction, Etc.
Limitations of space confine the writer to merely general
remarks regarding the attitudes and approaches which the
two new Justices bring toward administrative law. Several
decisions, some of them discussed previously in this article,
make it quite clear that Justices Clark and Minton have no
prejudice against the administrative process. In fact, they
seem to be even more willing than the old administrative law
teacher, Justice Frankfurter, to allow it free play within broad
areas of action. Administrative "expertise" usually was up-
held by the Court during the Term. However, the Court did
indicate in one decision that the remedial purposes for which
Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act were to be
broadly construed. -'05 This, however, is no manifestation of
hostility toward the administrative process, it merely dem-
onstrates a respect for the legislative process.
205 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 70 S. Ct. 445, 94 L. Ed.
(1950).
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In general, the two new Justices approached the construc-
tion or interpretation of statutes as functionalists, rather than
as metaphysicians. This was especially true, as previously
indicated, if the statute to be construed was one of those in
the class of social legislation. True, there were several occa-
sions when they played the role of the strict constructionist
and used the "plain meaning" canon of statutory interpreta-
tion, as in the tax decisions of the Term. Nevertheless, their
usual approach to a problem of statutory construction was
one of "what was it meant to do," rather than "what does it
say."
However, the two new Justices, especially Justice Minton,
displayed an unusually deep respect for stare decisis. Justice
Minton, after all, had been a federal circuit court judge and
had grown accustomed to following the precedents declared
by a higher judicial authority. Stare decisis, while a desirable
postulate, essential for certainty in the law, can be misused
if too automatically applied in the field of constitutional law.
The county unit-rule case illustrates a situation where the
new Justices could better have served the cause of the Con-
stitution and the Court by casting their vote in favor, at least,
of a decision on the merits, rather than join the per curiam
opinion which preserved stare decisis, perhaps, but damaged
representative government in Georgia.
X.
Concluding Observations
What, then, of Justices Clark and Minton? First let it be
said that the two new Justices worked very hard and pro-
duced an unusual number of opinions for freshman Justices. -00
In the line-up of Justices they were usually found on the
majority side. This writer has attempted to show that this
206 Each of the new justices wrote twelve opinions which was greater than
any other Justice's contribution, save for Justices Black and Jackson, who each
handed down 13 written opinions.
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undoubtedly resulted from the fact that their judicial views
were peculiarly reflective of the current tides of public opin-
ion. Their presence on the Court beyond a doubt has played
a major part in pushing the Court to furnishing a quicker
response to the fluctuations of public opinion than might have
been the case otherwise if Justices Murphy and Rutledge had
lived. A notable example of this was the "non-Communist"
oath decision.
The two new Justices have not as yet clearly displayed
their allegiance to either the Frankfurter-Jackson, or the
Black-Douglas wing of the Court. On the one hand they have
manifested a tendency to go along with the former group in
their more reserved attitude toward the judicial protection of
civil liberties. On the other hand, they seem to share the more
expansive view which Justice Black, especially, takes of the
federal and state powers of regulation. And just to com-
plicate the picture, the statistics of the Term show that Jus-
tice Black has joined Justices Frankfurter and Jackson in an
increasing number of dissenting opinions.2"7 This was appar-
ent in the criminal procedure and free speech decisions. The
old opponents of the Roosevelt Court may be closing ranks
as the new Court, in their opinion, drifts in the dangerous di-
rection of allowing promiscuous legislative and judicial inqui-
sitions in the realm of what they regard as free thought.
If any final comment may be made of the work of Justices
Clark and Minton, it is that they pursued a middle-of-the-
road judicial philosophy. Careful not to unspade the ground
covered before, amenable to cautious advance in the areas
where public opinion had flashed a green, or at least, an am-
ber light, and declining invitations to proceed into uncharted
judicial territory, they have helped to keep the Court on
a fairly even keel throughout the term. Those who might be
uneasy about the possible ramifications of the county unit-
rule case and the Rabinowitz decision take heart from the
207 These two personality opposites joined in ten dissents.
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anti-segregation cases. While those who worry at the ever
expanding federal and state powers of regulation may take
a measure of comfort in the tax cases, or the Yellow Cab de-
cision. At the 1949-50 Term there was a little something for
everybody, and that, in a sentence, sums up the two new
Supreme Court Justices. Those who recall Justice Murphy's
emotional, almost spiritual defense of civil liberties, or re-
member Justice Rutledge's independent liberalism, may not
be convinced that the replacing of the good by the average
is enough in this crucial day. However, what is done cannot
be undone; and all can take fresh appraisal that in a con-
stitutional democracy the Supreme Court should neither run
too far ahead, or lag too far behind, the will of the people.
It is with the people themselves that the battle for individual
freedom and personal security, both political and economic,
must be won. If so, Justices Clark and Minton will neither
make nor mar the final outcome. For, as Walt Whitman re-
minds us: "Liberty relies upon itself, invites no one, prom-
ises nothing, sits in calmness and light, is positive and com-
posed, and knows no discouragement." Our fate, then, is ours
to determine, not the Supreme Court, but-they can help!
Alfred Long Scanlan
